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CHAPTER· I 
INTRODUCTION 
The agricultural sector of the United States has undergone many 
changes in the past few decades. Along with the technological revolu-
tion in production, there have been many changes in the market structure 
for farm products and inputs.· Many of the changes in the market struc-
ture have been toward fewer and larger firms and a higher degree of 
business concentration~ 
The farming industry is characterized by a large number· of 
individual farm firms whi'ch operate independently of one another and 
market one or more· products. ·· In addition, these farm firms purdiase 
product1on inputs from :many sources throughout the nonfarm sector of the 
economy. The marketing system·attempts to perform the functions 
necessary to make· the products·available in time, place, and form to 
. the buyers". The training, skill, and capital required for farming· 
operations, along wtth specialization in production and marketing, makes· 
it impractical, if not impossible, for an individual farmer to perform 
all of the· marketing and· purchasing functions necessary for the conduct 
of his business. Therefore, it is necessary for farmers either to 
depend upon established marketing firms or to create their own 
organizations for marketing farm products and purchasing production 
inputs. 
1 / 
2 
Low Farm Income 
The typical agricultural firm is small and the degree ·of -business· 
· concentration- among such fi"rms· is 1 OWo Therefore; for a 11 practita l 
purposes, most producers-of·farm products-have virtually no control over. 
prices at which they sen· their products or buy their .production inputs. 
As a consequence, farmers· are·price-takerso 
Prices tend to· move· toward a level that wi 11 cl ear the market under· · 
existing conditions~of ~emand~- But regardless· of ~hether prices rise 
or fall, some .farmers will continue to· produce. in the short-runo Farmers 
have fixed production· resources which they will attempt to employ so 
long as their value in use·:exceeds their salvage value. 1 Farmers, _like 
other entrepreneurs; attempt·to· equate·themarginal value product of the· 
.. 
factor of productfon wtth·the·marginal factor cost to maximize profits 
or to minimize losses·o 2 Since· farm labor has a very.low salvage value; 
the return to labor· can be· less. than in nonfarm sectors and still not· 
force laborers··out of· the· farming~sectoro 
Over time the per capita farm income from agriculture has remained 
far below that of the· nonfarm per capita income, The data in Table I 
indicate that per capita· farm income.from farm sources was 1,112 dollars 
in 19650 For,the same year, the per capita nonfarm-income was 2,466 
dollarso Thus, the per capita farm income from agriculture was less than 
one half as much as nonfarm per capita incomeo 
1Glenn L Johnson, 11 The State of Agricultural Supply Analysis," 
Journal of Farm· Economtcs, Volo XLlI · (May·~ 1960), pp, 435-452 o 
2The marginal value product'.of factor\is the value of the product· 
produced ·by an additional unit of a factor of production, and the. 
marginal -factor cost is the cost of an additional unit of the factor 
of·productiono 
TABLE I 
PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME OF FARM AND NONFARM 
POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1946-1965 
From Farm · From Nonfarm 
Year Sources Sources Non farm 
Dollars 
1946 609 179 1 , 217 
1947 613 205 1 ,267 
1948 733 239 1 ,365 
1949 549 256 1 ,362 
1950 612 272 1,458 
1951 740 297 1 ,548 
1952 706 309 1 ,609 
1953 672 324 1 ,677 
1954 658 312 1 ,678 
1955 597 325 l, 772 
1956 600 352 l ,852 
1957 625 375 1 ,902 
1958 747 390 1 , 915 
1959· · 664 425 l , 998 
1960 733 461 2,014 
1961 819 468 2,051 
1962 850 490 2, 131 
1963 · 899 504 2,198 
1964 860 521 2,343 
1965 1, n 2 552 2,466 
Source: U, S ~ Department of A·grkul ture, 
Farm Income Situation, Economic Research Service, 
FIS--203 (Washington, July, 1966), p, 44, 
3 
4 
Poss i bil iti es of Profits in the Nonfarm Sector 
The marketing and farm supply. industries operate under conditions·---· 
of imperfect competiti'on·;· and: firms ·in an imperfectly competitive market · · 
· structure can regulate prices··and output to some extent. The ability· to· ·· · 
regulate ·prices and output increases the possibilities of making economic 
profits. 3 · .. ··· ··· · · · · 
· Average :profit rate ·.was· used· by Bain to compare the profitability· 
..... 
of different industrtes·that··have different degrees of concentration . 
. R - C - D - iV Average profit. rate on· equity·;· according to· Bain, , s . v . . ; 
where R is sales :revenue·;·:.c· is currently.incurred costs, Dis deprecia-
tion and amortization, ;···is'"current-interest rate, and Vis owners' 
investment .. Using·thi's'formufa, Bai_n developed the data in Table u. 4 
The agricult~ral· sector~· as would be expected, had the lowest .return 
for any industry-._· 
As indicated··,n· Table- u;· profit rates vary considerably among 
various sectors.of the economy; In 1953, .this variation ranged from 
a low of· about·3 percent for-agriculture-to a high of more than 10 
percent for finance 1 ··rht:n'Tlanufacturing sector, which had an 8 percent· · 
returnk was .categorized into smaller aggregates. The 1953 profit rate 
after tax was· 12.9 percent··for~motor· vehicles and equipment, 10.9 for 
e 1 ectri ca 1 equipment·~· 9·. 5 for· chemi ca 1 s, 8, 7 for tobacco mam,Jfacture, 
9.8 for canned goods ·and 5;1 for meat packing. 5 
3Economic profits are funds left after paying all factors of 
production the-price·they·coa,d·receive· in their best alternative uses. 
4Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (New York, 1959), p. 366. 
5Bain, p. 385. 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE PROFIT RATE ON EQUITY FOR SELECTED SECTORS 
OF THE ECONOMY, UNITED STATES, 1953 
Sector. 
Finance 
Manuracturing 
Construction 
Services 
Wholesale and Retail 
Public Utilities · 
Mining 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Average.all sectors 
Average Profit Rate 
(after tax) 
(percent) 
10 0 l 
8 0 1 
7.8 
5,9 
5,7 
5 0 l 
4.5 
2.9 
7.8 
Source: Joe·s. Bain, Industrial Organization (New 
York, 1959), p. 385. 
Farmers may have a greater opportunity to enjoy higher profit rates 
on equities by forming cooperative marketing and purchasing firms, 
Cooperatives, which are'operated efficiently as business institutions. 
and which adhere strictly to the service at cost principle, may help 
farmer-members to realize greater total returns from their farm products. 
Although farmer~members of cooperatives operate their farms as independ~ 
ent businesses, they may··coordinate their marketing and purchasing 
activities through cooperative associations. 
Cooperative firms have·played a significant role in marketing farm 
products and· purchasing farm inputs in the United States. The Farmer 
Cooperative Service reported that, inl964 approximately 9,000 farmer 
cooperative firms were· engaged in marketing farm products, ~istributing 
farm supplies, and furnishing· serviceso 6 They handled, in dollar terms, 
about ·one-fourth of the fa-rm·· products marketed and one-fifth of the 
farm inputs ·_purchased by--farmers. These cooperatives .serve their members 
by doing business at cost and by providing services not otherwise 
availableo 
Obje~tives of the Study 
\ 
The major purpose ·of·this·~tudy was to evaluate the· growth and·the 
potential benefits to: farmers of cooperative firms in the marketing of: 
farm products and· in the· purchasing of farm supplies~ Specifically, the 
objectives were as follow·:"· 
1. To determine the potential advantages of cooperative 
firms for farmer-members;. 
2. · To investigate· the··-effects of horizontal and vertical, 
integration by-cc;ooperatives; 
3, To review the historica1 growth and determine the 
growth rates·of'.cOoperative marketing of farm products 
and purchasing of farm supplies in the United States, 
Organization and Procedure' 
Cooperative firms ·may· have goals and operating proc~dures which 
are different from those'appHcable for noncooperative firms ·in the 
United States· economy, · In· Chapter II, the cooperative firm is defined·, 
and.principles of organization and operation-of-cooperative firms·are 
68, L Swanson, Statistics of Farmer Coo eratives, 1964-65, Farmer. 
Cooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agricu ture ashington, 1966) 
p. ,. 
consideredo Marginal analysis and market structure theory are used to 
determine the potenti'al advantages of cooperative firms for their· 
members in marketing farm products and purchasing farm supplieso 
Integration may ·be··one· means of growth employed by cooperative 
firmso Marginal analysi.s ·is,·used to investigate the effects of hori;.. 
zontal and· vertical fotegration by cooperatives. Motives,. economic 
7 
firm models, .and· economic"effects of horizonta.l integration by coopera.;.· · ·· 
tives are analyzed· in-Chapter III~ Similar considerations and analysis 
for vertical integration:·by- cooperative firms-are· included in Chapter· rv·o 
Chapter V i'ncludes· a'summary of· the history of the development of· 
cooperative marketing of--farm products as derived from-.a review of the· 
literature. Detailed·consideration is given to the performance of one 
firm in one industry- as· .. an··example of integratfon by cooper:-ative 
marketing fi.rms.-' The· re1ati've··importance of cooperative marketing in 
the agricultural marketing--sector· of· the United States economy is· 
obtained from secondary data·and least squares statistical techniques···· ·· 
are used to determiner the trend in the growth of cooperative marketing 
of farm products~· ... · · · · ., .. ·· 
Chapter VI includes"the· history of the development of cooperative · · 
purchasing firms, involved· .. primarily in-marketi.ng farm supplies to 
farmers,· an example of·-integration· by such firms,- and the growth rate 
of cooperative purchasing· of farm supplies, Finally, Chapter VII is 
devoted to a summary of-the study. 
CHAPTER II 
THE COOPERATIVE FIRM: DEFINITIONS AND MODELS 
Definitions of Cooperative Firms . 
The production·ot·economic'goods and services usually is an. 
intricate procesr; · Arrangements are made for the assembly of. raw 
materials and· supp11es;-capfta1~ labor, and manag~ment are·applied in 
the proper amounts;· and· fina11y; through a planned program of operations,·. 
· the production of·goods~and services· is effected •. The unit·of 
organization· that· performs' these functions ·,s the firm. 
• The firm has· been· defined in many· ways. For ·example, Boulding 
says that a firm is an economic· organism that buys inputs, performs-
operations :on them, and· sens the results with the expectation of . 
making a prof'it,L Penrose views the firm as a pool of resources.which 
are utilized within an· ~dmtnistrative framework. 2 Each of these defini~ · 
tions is·-designed with a·specific parpose in mind and, therefore, may 
·not be fully appropriate~for· other'uses~ 
Boulding is concerned' primarily with profit seeking in the business·· 
world, He recognizes· oth~r·economic organisms ~ot primarily concerned 
with maximizing profits, For example, a wage_:earner and a hospital 
1 K. L Boulding, EconomH: Analysis ·(New York, 1955), p. 491. 
2L L Penrose,- The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (New York, 
1959),·p. 24, --- ---
8 
·would be considered economtc organisms under his terminology. 
The definition of· the fi.rm by Penrose is designed for use in-
studying the growth of· fitms· and is somewhat less restrictive than 
Bou1ding 1 s definition·of· a· firm~ 
9 
A broad definition· of· an economic firm would characterize it as an-· -
economic organization that·exists for· the purpose of producing economic 
goods and services·; the--maximization of profits, and the growth of the 
business over· time~ · If· this· definition is applied to cooperative organi-
zations, it must· be concl uded''that they are firms, Cooperative organi za.;. 
ti ans, which are .owned and··control led by member-patrons, are fully 
recognized under· existinglaws·as legal entities. They are engaged in 
the production of· goods a:nd·services, and they attempt to maximize 
profits for their member~owners. They also attempt to show business. 
growth over time,· 
In contrast to· the· conc1us1on that cooperatives are economic firmsr 
some authors argue that a·cooperative organization is merely an· exten-
sion of farm firms and ·is· not, itself, .a firm? 3 However, this position'· 
that cooperatives are not··economic firms has been accepted by relatively· 
few people. Furthermore~ ·there is an abundance of legal and institu-
tional evidence· supporting"thetheory that cooperatives,are legal 
entities and, therefore, firms· in the full sense of the word, There-
fore, this study shall treat them as firms, 
3Appendix A treats the proposition that a cooperative is not a 
firm, 
10 
Principles of the Cooperative Firm 
. . - . ' . 
There are certain princfp,es·or fundamental concepts which are. 
distinct attributes· of cooperatives.and set them apart from other types 
of business organizations: •According to Schaars,4 these basic principles 
are, l) democratic control, 2} limited returns on capital, and 3) service 
at costo 
Democratic Control· 
The principle of democratic control dictates that the control and · 
ownership of the cooperative· firm is vested 1n the member-patrons. 
Democratic control may b1:r iriterpreted as 11 one man-one vote" or one vote 
per member, or it'may· be;on·some other type of a representative basis.·· 
This applies both to individual member;.patrons and to local member-firms 
in the case of a federated cooperative association. The control of the 
cooperative is exercised bY' the owners who are the patrons of the 
business rather than· by those· who·merely· supply the capital! 
In some -cooperat·1ve ·associations, voting may be done on a basis of 
the dollar volume· of business .. transacted with the firm,_· Alternatively,-
voting could be· on ·a· basts· of 11 one man-one vote 11 plus additional votes · 
based on patronag~,·on· shares of stock, or on some other-criteria. 
These methods of t:ontro1·also·"are representative in·that they recognize 
the importance of volume· to a· cooperative association I s effectiveness 
as a business· firm,--and'they· rec:ognize the differences in economic 
interests in the association, 
4Marvin A. Schaars, ."Basic Principles of Cooperatives: Their 
Growth and Development, 11 AgriculturaL,Cooperation (Minneapolis, 1957), 
p. 'J 91 , 
11 
Regardless of how it ts accomplished, democratic control is 
considered as one of the fundamental principles of the cooperative firmo 
It tends to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
memberso 5 In no other form of business organization is there a com-
parable patron-owner relationshipo This principle grants all active 
members equal privileges of participation in the control of their firmo 
Limited Returns on Capital 
Limited returns on capita1· is another basic characteristic of a 
true coop~rat1veo · According·to this principle, _the return on the 
members 0 invested capital is restricted to a maximum percentage amounto 
The capital requirements of· a cooperative firm are no different from 
those .of noncooperative businesses engaged in similar serviceso 
However, the relationship of the investor to the business is quite 
different. In the cooperative, the member invests his money primarily 
so that the firm may provide desired services for him. His decision to 
enter or remain as a part~owner of the cooperative is made largely on 
the basis of his opportunity for economic benefit as a patron-user. 
However, in the noncooperative form of business organization, investor 
returns are limited only by the profitability of the enterprise and the 
s 1 ze of the investment o ·· · 
The principle of paying a limited amount for the use of capital 
tends to prevent or minimize•any conflict of interest between patrons 
as users of the business'·am:I' investors as owners of the business. In 
the cooperative firm, ownership is related very closely with patronage 
5UoSo Department of Agriculture, Farmer.Cooperatives -in the United 
States, Farmer Cooperative Service, .Bulletin 1 (Washington, 1965) 
po Bo 
12 
and the danger· of ownership becoming ~oncentrated among a few investors 
is minimized. Thus, investment in a cooperative business is tied to· the··· 
use of its ,serv·ices and··1s·not·'.motivated by expectations of profit from 
capital investment~ · The profit·of the cooperative firm is for its 
member;.patrons and not for· its· capital, Federal and state laws both 
···require a limitation by-cooperatives on returns to capital 1 In general, 
these laws·specify the·maximum·returns that the cooperative can pay on-· 
invested capttal, · In most··states, the maximum payment is 1 imited to 8 
percent, but in some· states it· is·,1ess~ 6 In all states cooperatives 
may pay any_amount less than the maximum. 
Service at Cost · · .. · · , 
A third basic· requtrement· of a true cooperative is service at· cost,· 
This principle often··ts· referred to as operation on a cost~of-doing 
business basis, True cooperatives·operate on the basis of service at 
cost. However, it is not·posstble· to anticipate exact costs; therefore,· 
adjustments must· bEr made··w,th ·member;.patrons. at the close of the fisca 1 
year·1 · This usually is··accompHshed through a patronage payment in 
which savings {net margins) ·above' costs are- returned to patrons on a 
· basis proporti ona 1 · to ·their' use of the cooperative, However, the methods 
,' 
of distribution of sav·ings' to·members vary greatly among cooperative 
firms·i For example; some··cooperative marketing firms pool all proceeds 
from sales;,deduct an· costs·; and· then distribute the net proceeds. 
Under this planof·operation~··the cooperative may operate on a cost 
basis even thoug_h· there' a:re··mr· patronage payments, as such,' to distribute 
to members', In purchasing cooperatives, ,the products usually are priced 
6 Ibid., p, 9, 
13 
at the going market· prictro · ·At· the close of the fiscal year~ net· savi"ngs··· 
are allocated· to· member:..patrons··fo· proportion to their patronageo . Most 
·· grain marketing· cooperatives· operate· in th.is manner~ 
The princ1p,e·~f·service·at··cost· recognizes the agency.relationship 
of the cooperative to··i,ts'·member;.;patrons·. · Even though the cooperative·· 
firm .is a· 1ega1 entity· and· i's sep~rat~r and· distinct from its members, ·· 
it st_i 11 · is the· agerit· of its members--·and ·1 s designed to serve them at.··· 
cost·o · ·In' no· sense··of· the word· is··it designed to profit on service·s 
rendered· its· members·,· ··rhe· true cQe>perative firm returns all net proceeds· 
either in cash or in· so.me form of equity-claim to· the member-patronso .: 
· - The savings·rea11zed after·deducting total cost belong to the cooperative 
members, not ;to the coopera:ti ve firm·~· · The· cooperative profits or net 
savings are·shared· by· each·member:..patron in:proportion to the volume 
of business he· has· transacted··with· his· cooperative, Thus, service at 
cost, as one· of the fundamentai prihciples~ dictates that the cooperative 
firm as a corporate entity is nonprofit in charactero 
Classification of Cooperative Firms 
. . .. 
Agricultural· cooperatives·are associated with practically all 
·phases of farming· acti:vity.o Consequently it· is difficu·lt to set forth 
·, 
a classification·which· woa1d be logical·and· at"the· same time broad 
enoagh to·:tncl ude· an ··agricultural cooperative activityo For example, 
cooperatives· might· be· c1aS'sified by- si:ze of· firm, type of membership, . 
legal status't commodi:ties· or· supplies· handled, geographic area covered, 
or functions performedo .. The two most pertinent classifications ·Of. 
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cooperatives for the purpose of this study are based on (1) membership 
a f fil ta Uon a11d ( 2) functions perf O'rmed. 7 
Membershil} Affiliation 
From the standpoint .of membership affiliation, cooperattve 
associati9ns may be classified as local, centralized, federated, or. 
mixed •. 
Local Cooperatives. Local cooperatives are essentially cooperatives 
. . 
providing services in a local area such •s a trading center~ a county, 
or some other concentra.tion point. Local marketing cooperatives usually 
perform a.limited number of services in the marketing process, and 
local purchasing cooperatives usually are operated at the retail level 
and sell directly to farmers.· Regardless of functions performed by 
local cooperatives, individual farmers are.direct members of the 
associ ati·ons ,, .· 
Farmers belong to. loca,1 cooperative associations. to maximize their 
personal net incomes. They hope to make farming more profitable by 
supporting and patronizing their ~ooperative .associatinn. The board 
of directors of a cooperative asso~iation is elected by the farmer-
members .. and is restricted to. active members of .the cooperative. Local 
cooperatives are autonomous. firms and may or may not .affiliate with· 
other cooperatives to form federated cooperative associations.. Further-
more., ·the individual member may withqraw his membership from the local 
7Henry H. Bakken and Marvin A. Schaars, The .Economics of Coopera .. 
tive Marketing (New York, 1937), pp. 204-228, and Richard L. Kohls, · 
Marketing of A9ri.cultural Products (New York, ·1967), pp. 222-227. 
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cooperative if he chooses, Eli gi bil i ty and procedures for withdrawal, 
however, are regulated by bylaws governing the cooperative. 
Federated Cooperative. A federated cooperative, often referred to 
as a cooperative of cooperatives or as a regional cooperattve8, is a. 
business structure formed through the horizontal integration of local 
cooperative associations. Thus, the members of a federated cooperative 
are local cooperatives, and farmer-members of local cooperatives are 
indirectly members of the federated association. 
Although joined together to gain efficiency in business operations, 
and perhaps some degree of market power, the local cooperatives remain 
as autonomous units operated by local managers who are appointed by and 
responsible to local boards of directors. The local boards of directors, 
in turn, are elected by the farmer-members of the local associations, 
Therefore~ each local cooperative in a federated cooperative association 
is a separate corporate entity, but it is affiliated with the federation 
and acts under membership regulatio~s .. 
The federated cooperative is governed by a board of directors which 
is elected by, and which represents, the local associati.ons. Thus in 
the federation, control rests with the local associations that constitute 
its membership. The board for the federation appoints a general manager 
who directs the business operations of the cooperative. 
8A regional cooperative is one-which, .regardless of functions 
performed, serves a large area such as a state or a number of states. 
Federations.often are referred to as regional cooperatives. Centralized 
cooperatives also may be regional associations. · The classification 
of regionals·is based entirely on the makeup of ·their membership. 
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Any gross revenue of the federation which is in excess of costs 
(net savings or profit) is returned to the local member cooperatives on 
a basis proportional to their volume of business transacted through the 
federation. 
Centralized Cooperatives. A centralized cooperative is one which 
serves a large area~ Like federated cooperatives, centralized coopeta-
tives often are referred. to as regional associations.· Some centralized 
regionals serve areas which encompass an ~ntire state or perhaps several 
states. 
Structurally, a centralized association is very similar to a local 
cooperative. In fact, it is an elaboration of the independent local. 
In both instances, individual persons comprise the membership. Patrons 
are direct members of the centralized association in the same way that 
they are direct members of a local. cooperative. Thus, farmer-members 
control the centralized association through a board of directors which 
appoints a general manager who supervises the entire operation of the 
centra.l ized cooperative. · 
In some respects centralized cooperatives are· similar to federated 
associations .. · For example, both types encompass a large geographic 
area, and they may perform essentially _the same functions. They differ 
greatly, however~ with respect to membership and control, In the 
centralized association;. patrons are direct members; there are no 
autonomous local associations, But in the federation, autonomous local 
associations comprise the membership. Therefore, in a centralized 
association, control and authority are centralized in the headquarters'. 
organization, but in a federated association control is decentralized 
and.lodges in the autonomous local association. Furthermore, if _the 
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centralized ~ssociat1on operates local units {which it may own outtight), 
these local units,are S\Jbject to control directly through the board of 
directors and manager of the centralized as,soci-ation and not ,by the 
patrons of each local assoctation. Thus, .local units have very limited 
functio~s in a centralized association. 
Mixed Cooperatives. Large,regional cooperatives may have a ,dual-
structure which ·involves both federated and centralized types of 
associations, Such a combination of structures usually is ·referred. 
to as.a mixed-type cooperative. The mixed-type associati.on may operate 
through local affiliated units which represent a federated _structure.· 
But in addition,. it may have a centra.lized structure in which 
individuals are direct members. of th.e cooperative. In _some instances, -
although the members are the local cooperatives, .the farmers sign a 
contract directly with the central association •. 
Voting rights constitqte- one of ·the major problems in this type .of. 
cooperative a~socfation. Where local. cooperatives and-individuals both 
are fflembers of the overhead cooperative, that is the mixed associati~n, -
there is a question pf what constitutes democratic control. Fqr example,· 
in this case who h~.s a vote?- Some,mixed-type cooperatives have solved, 
this . problem by a 11 owing one vote for each local cooperative plus-
add 1 ttonal votes based on the volume of business conducted with the. 
overhead associati,on and one vote. fo·r each individual plus additional-. 
votes based on volume of business .conducted. 
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Functions Performed 
Cooperative firms1 classified on the basis of functions performed, -
may be grouped as marketing, purchasing, and service cooperatives. 
Marketing Cooperatives; Marketing cooperatives are associations 
through which farmers may se 11 their products. They may perform some 
or all marketing services for their members. These services could 
include selling, .wholesaling, processing, grading, packing, and other 
marketing functions, The objective of a marketing cooperative is to 
obtain the highest farm price for the products farmers have to sell 
and thus maximize gross farm receipts. - Most of the marketing coopera-
tives are single commodity organizations, but some are multiple commodity 
organizations_, · Some marketing cooperatives, especially those which are 
integrated both horizo~tally and vertically, perform complete marketing 
functions. The~e associations usually operate at a regional or national 
level. 
Purchasing Cooperatives. Purchasing cooperatives are those through 
which memJ:>ers may purchase many of their farm inputs such as fertilizer, 
feed, seeds, farm machinery, insecticides, and petroleum products. 
Purchas_ing cooperatives attempt to_ provide their members with high-. 
quality production supplies at the lowest possible cost, and-thus 
effect savings for the farmer-member. Although the principal source of 
savings on farm inputs usually will come from lower prices, savings 
also may be obtained by providing higher quality products, better _and 
mo,re services, and supplies and equipment which are better adap.ted_to 
the farming operations. 
Many purchasing cooperatives are integrated horizontally and 
vertically. They may manufacture, process, .wholesale, and retail the 
farm inputs, and they may acquire the sources of raw materials. In 
most states there are state-wide or regional :Purchasing cooperative 
associations. These associatio~s often are structured on a federated 
basis, but they may be centralized cooperatives. 
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Service Cooperatives. Service cooperatives usually are formed to. 
provide farmer-members with services, some of which may not otherwise. 
be available. These services might include, for example, electrical 
service, insurance~ credit, irrigation and drainage, and transportation. 
Service cooperatives attempt to provide farmer-members with services at 
the lowest possible cost and thus increase net returns from farming 
operatfons. Service cooperatives, however, are not limited to persons 
engaged in farming operations. Nonfarm people are members of service . 
cooperatives which provide services for both urban and rural people. 
Monopsony and the Cooperative Marketing Fi rm . 
The most extreme form of imperfect competition in purchasing is· 
monopsony. 9 A monopsonist is the sole buyer of a resource. 10 In buying 
farm products as production inputs, the monopsonist faces~ near purely 
competitive resource market. · The monopsonist determines the quantity 
9oligopsony may exist in buying farm products. Oligopsony means 
a few buyers of the resource and there may or may not be·.interdependence 
between buyers to set the resource price in the market. 
10It is assumed that the. farm product is a resource of the buying 
firms, eithe,r cooperative or noncooperative. 
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of the re~ource taken, and the market will set-the price.· Thus, resource 
·1 "t t" 0 t 11 exp 01 a .,on ex1s Si 
Monopsony in buying farm products results in monopsonistic 
exploitation of farmers as resource sellers .. The monopsonist will employ 
resources up to the potnt: where marginal revenue product of the resource 
is equal to its marginal resource cost. This is .shown in Figure l(a}, 
where SY is the market supply .curve for .resource Y; MRc/ 2 is the 
marginal resource cost curve and Hes above the supply curve; MRP/ 3 is 
the marginal revenue product.of the resource Y; and VMP/ 4 is the value 
of marginal :product curve of the resource v~ 
The profit'"'.maximi zing level of ·resource employment is that at which 
MRPj ~ MRCY. Since the point where marginal revenue product equates 
with marginal resource cost·,exceeds the resource .(farm product) price, 
units .of the resource are paid less .than the value which they add to the 
firm 0 s revenue~ The resource owner (farmer) is paid OPY; the resource 
adds OV to the firm.· The monopsonistic exploitation of the resource is 
Pyv per unit of the product Y"aS shown in Figure l(a). This is an·· 
example of how farmers may be moraopsonistically exploited as owners ·Of 
the resources. 
nResource. exploitation as used in this study is .defined to mean 
that units of:resource are paid less than the value of the product they 
add to the·economy',s output as a result of applying the marginali.st 
maximization principles under imperfectly competitive market structure,· 
and is not i nte.nded to connote any ethi ca·1 Judgments. 
. . . . 
12MRC is the change in the firm 1 s total cost resulting from a one 
tinit changl in the pu~cha~e of the resource per unit.of time. 
13MRP · is the change in the firm's total revenue resulting from a 
one unit cKahge in .resource Y used per unit of -tim~ •. 
" 14vMP· is the market.value of a fir~'s increm~nt in product when it 
increa~es {he employment level of resource Y.by one unit per unit of 
time.· 
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Farmers through thetr· cooperative can minimize rnonopsonistic· ·•· · · 
exploitation by nonoooperativemarketing firms. Figure l(b) represents 
the monopsonist situation· before· and after the entry .of a cooperative·. 
firm. The monopsonist· employs.the level ·yb of resource Y before- the 
cooperative·sets prices.· ··The·price is OPb per unit-of resource·v. · 
Resource Y is being exploited because OPb is less than its marginal -
revenue product~ Ov~ 
Ass.ume that all farmers· i·n the community form a bargaining 
cooperative. 15 Then the cooperative could bargain with the monopsonist 
to establish .the price of the resource. Assume _that the cooperative 
can reach OP2 price per· unit for all units purchased or OYc of resource 
Y. The supply curve facing· the monopsonist will be PcMSY. · The marginal 
resource cost will be altered to Pc~NK, and it is discontinuous-between 
Mand N.- 16 
The monopsonist·maximizes profit by using the quantity Yc,:at which 
the new marginal resource· cost equals .to marginal revenue product· of Y .. 
Thus, the price set by· the· cooperative _could eliminat_e or reduce· 
monopsonistic exploitation·of farmers as owners of the resource and 
increase the quantity of farm products marketed. 
Monopoly and the Cooperative Marketing Firm 
Monopoly profits may exist if·the resource buying firm faces a 
downward sloping demand curve for its product. Again, as shown.in 
15 rn this situation, bilateral monopoly exists (i.e~ monopsony in 
buying and monopoly· in.se11ing), 
. ' ' .. ' 
16Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation (New York, 1966), p. 286. · · · 
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Figure 1 (a), a unit of the· resource, Y, _adds VMPY to the economy·1:ir ··· · 
output and MRP Y to the·.firm·•·s· output. Since the resource buying firm 
maximizes profits where·MRC~-~ MRPY, the resource is paid OPY. The· 
unit of the resource adds·ov to the firm's revenue, but consumers· va'lue 
the resultant product at' Oq·. The difference, vq, represents an element· 
of monopoly-profit obtained· from the consumers of the product~ 
Cooperative marketing· firms· could capture such monopoly elements •. 
by purchasing the farmers· products and competing directly with the non-
cooperative firm. The·monopoTy profi.ts could then be distributed to 
farmers on a patronage· bas-is,· 
Figure -2(a) shows· cost· and revenue curves of a noncooperative, 
imperfectly competitive ·fi·rm .. · AC1 is the firm's average cost; MC 1 is 
its respective marginal cost;· 001 is the demand curve for the firm·•s· 
product, and MR1 is its respective marginal revenue. The fjrm produces 
at the profit-maximizing··amount of output, where its marginal cost' is 
equal to marginal·-revenue;· 1t: sells its product for~pric, OP per unit~ 
Its profit pe~ unit;~· C~P~: and· the total economic profit is PC1LK. 
Assume that .some farmers· in· the area form. a cooperative firm to .· 
market .their product.· It would·pay the going market price to farmer-
members according· to the· aggregate supply of and the aggregate demand 
for the product; The .cooperative would share the resource market and 
the prod~ct market with the· noncooperati've firm. Figure 2(b} shows· the 
cost and revenue conditions of the noncooperative firm after the entry 
of the cooperative·firm.·-·No--change·in aggregate output is assumed. 
Figure 2(c) shows the possible cost and revenue curves.of the cooperative 
firm • 
.. 
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Figure 2. Cost and Revenue Curves for a Cooperative and Noncooperative 
Firm in Marketing Farm Products. 
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Both firms .would produce at the profit-maximizing amount of· output, 
Xe and x2 respectively·.for· the· cooperativ~ and the noncooperative firm, 
and sell their output· for· op· per· unit. This assumes that· .there· are no 
aggressive price pol i ci es··between them. The _cooperative firm would· 
enjoy an economic profit .. of PCHG, The cooperative could return its·· 
excess profits PCHG tcr the· farmer-members .as patronage payments, . Thus, 
the cooperative members· would be paid the market price for the product 
plus ,patronage payments of· CP per unit. The .nonmember would be paid 
only .the ma·rket price·,·· 
The entry of the· cooperative firm and its. sharing of the resource· 
and. product market··with· thl::!' noncooperative firm will have some effects, 
The cooperative shares the·market demand curve·for the product. 002 is 
the demand curve th.at faces· the noncooperative firm after the entry of·. 
the cooperative·, and MR2 is· i'ts· respective marginal revenue.· Also the 
noncooperative fi'rm, fo· order· to· obtain its -necessary resources·,· would· 
be forced to· operate·at· a·1ower volume, pay- the farmer higher prices, 
or pay transportation· costs· to buy the resource from other markets. 
This would increase· its·costs:.·· .. The noncooperative firm's profit-
maximizing output· is\OX2·tn· Figure 2(b). · It ·would sell its product··at · 
OP per-unit-but have· less· economic profit, PC2NM. These_ types· of price 
adjustments wouldcontinue·unti_l the economic profits were eliminated, 
If one ,of these firms·-operated more -efficiently than the other, 
the less efficient-firm·wou1d· be forced out of business in the long-run, 
However, if the cooperative··were inefficient, the noncooperative fi.rm 
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could continue enjoying economic· profits and might be able to force the 
cooperative firm out of business, 17 
Imperfect Competition and Cooperative Purchasing Firm 
Imperfect competition· in- selling farm inputs may include oligopoly 
and monopoly. Oligopoly means that there is a small number of sellers 
of a particular product, and· any· one seller can affect the activities· 
of the others. For· these· types of imperfect competition, the firm 1 s 
demand curve slopes downward·and to the right.· Consequently, marginal 
revenue for the firm wi 11 be less than the price, The firm maximizes. 
profit by equating its marginal revenue with marginal cost. 18 The firm 
can control its output and·, indirectly, prices. Thus, the firm has 
monopoly market power. 
Lerner has suggested that the·degree of monopoly market power· be 
measured by the extent that·marginal cost diverges from the price of 
the product, :i 9 Lerner· used the formula, Zm = P ·- P MC , where Zm is·· 
monopoly .market power·, p· ·is product price, _and MC is the marginal cost 
of the product. 
In the marketing situation where perfect competition exists, price 
is equal to marg'inal cost and Zm = O. Thus,·no monopoly power exists in 
17William H. Nicholls, Im~erfect Competition within Agricultural 
Industries (Ames, 1941), pp, 2 4-227, 
18Marginal revenue·{MR) is the revenue derived from an additional 
unit; and .marginal cost (MC) is the cost of producing that additional 
unit of the product. 
19Abba P. Lerner, 11 The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of 
Monopoly Power," Review of Economic Studies, Vol, 1 (New York, 1933), 
pp. 157-175. 
perfect competition. The·greater the degree of market imperfection~ 
however, the greater wn1· be·the monopoly power in the market. · · 
The entry of the cooperative purchasing firm would minimize- the 
noncooperative firm's monopoly power. The cooperative can purchase 
farm inputs on the wholesale·1eve1 and may gain some prtce discounts. 
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The cooperative can· also"manufacture and process some of the farm inputs. 
It generally sells these·at· the going market price. It may gain economic 
profits which it may return' to its members as patronage payments~ If 
some profit is returned;· the· final farm input price will be less than 
if inputs are.purchased from· ryoncooperative firms. Thus; the cooperative 
could m1n1m1ze·monopoly power· in the market. 
Figure 3 depicts·the·hypothetical cost and revenue curve conditions 
for a purchasing· cooperative· and a similar noncooperati ve firm. Speci fi -
cally, AC is the average· cost of production~ MC is the marginal cost, 
DD'is the demand curve facing the firm, and MR is its marginal revenue 
curve. The prof1t-max1m1z1ng·output.is ov1, where MC equals MR. OP is 
the price per unit of product·v~· 
The cooperative and· noncooperative firms· will set prices· at the 
profit-maximizing level· of·outputs. Then, the cooperative would return 
the profits, C/LK~ ti:r its·members as patronage payments, The payment 
is c2P per unit of· product~ 
The noncooperative· flrm· could find that its customers were switching 
to the cooperative· and,if·so, consider lowering the product price· to 
offset competition:.· The· profit positions of the respective firms·would 
be affected by· the degree of· patron loyalty that could be maintained. 
The cooperative could eliminate·economic profits of the noncooperative 
firm, However, if the noncooperat·fve firm has enough.patron loyalty, 
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Products, 
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it may be able to keep·some·economic profitso The noncooperative firm's 
economic profits· will also be affected by the relative efficiency of· 
the cooperative firm. 'l'hus·, if the cooperative firm is efficientt it 
would minimize .monopoly.power. 
CHAPTER III 
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION BY COOPERATIVES 
In general, the· term·.",ntegration" is used in the broadest sense· 
to designate almost·any··ktnd· of coordination or fusion of business 
firms. 1 There are two· basic ktnds of economic integration, horizontal· 
and vertical·.· Integration· may be· achieved either through ownership or 
nonownership. If the· situation is such that one firm actually owns 
horizontally;. or vertica11y~re1ated marketing or production functions, 
it_is called ownership integration. Nonownership integration occurs·~··· 
when various functions.are .. brought under· unified control, but ownership· 
of the fi.rms remains separate.· Contracts usually are the legal basis 
of nonownersh1p 1ntegratton. 2· 
Integration of like··bustness units under one general administrative 
contra l is ca 11 ed hori zonta 1 i n~egra ti on. It is a type of organ i za;. 
tional or structl!lral growth,· or an organizationaY feature, and is· not 
a form of an organization ~.t ~· For the purpose of this stlidy,a· 
horizontally-integrated cooperative firm is a profit-maximizing fi-rm in 
which management-controls a number of units or plants which operate at. 
1Edwin·G~ Mourse and Horace B. Drury, Industrial Price Policies. 
and Economic Progress:·:(w~shington, 1?38), pp., 70-79. . . 
2
~or additional discussion of economic integration, see W. F. · 
Mue'ller, "The Economics of Vertical Integration~" American Cooperation 
(Washington, 1958), PP~ 715-725. · 
~------- -----
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the same economic stage of production, processing, marketing or 
pur~hasingo 3 Horfzontal integration may be achieved by cooperatives 
through the federation or merger of existing cooperatives~ or through 
internal growtho Horizontal integration in cooperatives most,often is 
accomplished through the federation of existing units or the addition 
of units to a federationo A federation is a group of firms which 
voluntarily group themselves for certain purposes under a single 
control and administration. 
The merger process involves combining two or more previously 
independent businesses under a single ownership and control •4 (wn-i=l,e 
merger-fs-orre-,·way-o-f--aehiev-ing ·either·horizonta·l"or-vertical -integrati-on, 
one should_n9t:equate integration with merger~ Integration can be 
effected through_ i nterna 1 growth of the firm as well as by externa 1 
growth, that ts_, throqgh merger, __ ,,-1 
Mergers of cooperative firms have. been successful in the dairy,. 
fruits and vegetab·les, and production supply fields, Man-ymergers 
have..been .. effec-ted--to capture -economies of scale in production, market-
ing, and purchasing functi·ons o { According to the Farmer Cooperative . 
Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, during the six-
. 
3Economic stage means any operating process capable of producing 
an economic product or service. 
4The term merger often is used synonymously with consolidation. 
Technically, the term merger is properly used to apply to the situation 
where one legal entity _which continues its legal life, acquires the 
assets of one or more other. companies which then cease to exist as 
legal entities. A consolidation takes place when a new legal entity 
is formed to take over the ~ssets af two or more companies. All of 
the companies whbse assets are .acquired no longer exist as legal· 
entities. For a detailed discussion of mergers .and consolidations, 
see E. F. Donaldson, Business Organization and Procedure (New York, 
1938), pp. 465-478. . 
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year period 1957 through 1962, about 325 cooperative mergers took place 
5 ) in the United States. · · 
In the United States, the Cooperative Grange League Federation 
.Exchange represented an outstanding example of a cooperative merger. 
The Grange League Federation w~s formed to coordinate the purchasing 
operations being performed by farmer cooperatives in the state of New 
York. It was developed out of several less effective cooperatives to 
perform a united cooperative purchasing service for its members, 
Recently, in 1964, the Grange League Federation and Eastern States 
Farmers Exchange were consolidated to form Agway Incorporated. 6 
Local, regional, and national cooperatives often integrate 
horizontally through the process of federation. Several national 
federations of regional supply cooperatives have been formed to process 
and manufacture farm supplies such as fertilizer, feed, and petroleum 
products. Federated marketing cooperatives~ such as grain elevators, 
cotton gins, dairy p'lants, and poultry plants which are commonplace in 
. most sections of the United States, are good examples of horizontally-
integrated firms, In many instances additional horizontal integration 
is achieved by the merger or consolidation of several federations of 
cooperatives. These federations of federations often are referred to as 
11 super cooperatives" or "super federations 11 • 
5u.s. Department of Agriculture, Farmer ·cooperatives in the United 
States, Farmer Cooperative Service, Bulletin No.· l··{Washihgton":-1955), 
p. 67. 
6u.s. Department of Agriculture, Major Regional Cooperatives 
Handling_ Supplies, Farmer CooRerative Service, General Report No. 140 
(Washington, 1967), p. 5. 
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Motives for Horizontal Integration by Cooperatives 
According to Knapp, 11 , , • horizontal integration permits 
cooperatives·to enjoy the economies and opportunities which are asso-
ciated with large-scale enterprise such as (1) the accessibility and use 
of capital; (2) the se'lectfon and use of management; and. (3) the applica-
tion of research techniques, 117 · General'ly speaking, however, horizontal 
integration by cooperative firms is motivated by the desire to achieve 
business concentration, ownership concentration, and economic efficiency, 
These motives appear to reflect steps which could give the cooperative 
firm greater economic power in the market, Each motive will be 
discussed separately, 
Business Concentration 
One of the characteristics of market structure is the number of 
firms in the industry. The concentration of firms is indicated not only 
by the number of firms, but also by the size distribution of the firms 
in the industry. For example, an industry could have 100 firms with 90 
percent of the business handled by one big firm, or an industry could 
have 10 firms with each firm accounting for an equal amount of the total 
business transacted. It is difficult to state which industry is more 
concentrated, A convenient measure has been devised by Bain8 which 
combines both measures (absolute numbers and relative size) into a 
. measure.of the degree of concentration, He used a description of the 
7Joseph G, Knapp, 11 Cooperative Expansion Through Horizontal 
Integration, 11 B.gri cu 1 tura 1 ~operation (Mi nnea po l'i s, 1957) , . p, 358. 
8Bain, p, 87. 
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percentage of business done by the largest four in the industry. This 
does not solve all problems~ but it should be useful in this study. 
Ownershi[ Concentratio~ 
Business concentration often is achieved by cooperatives through 
the organizational structure of horizontal integration. Through this 
structure , cooperatives may achieve a high degree of concentration of 
both ownership and control in the market place. A high degree of control 
and ownership may increase the marketing power of cooperatives and 
consequently could increase their net returns. If there were multiplant, 
horizontally-integrated cooperatives in the industry and centralized 
control for buying or selling, it becomes obvious that farmers could 
exert an extremely powerful influence. Thus, ownership concentration 
of the firms in the market may increase the individual firm 1 s net 
revenue for its owners. 
Economic Efficiency 
· Economic efficiency is an important motive for horizontal 
integration by business firms. Cooperative firms attempt to integrate 
horizontally, through federation or merger, until they have a plant 
which, if operated efficiently, will allow them to keep some of the 
possible economies of size in management, production, selling, and 
buying, The reverse may very we 11 be the situation if there a re 
diseconomies of size. In some instances, a horizontally-integrated 
cooperative may not have enough outlets to permit it to expand to an 
optimum scale of plant. A frequent solution to this problem is 
additional horizo~tal integration through federation, merger~ or 
consolidation,, As is explained later, such horizontal expansion. 
usually is accompani_ed by some vertic.al integration., 
Horizontally Integrated-Single -Plant Cooperative Model 
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Marginal -analysis may be used to develop the profit-maximizing 
model for the hori.~ontaJ ly-_inte_grated cooperative -firm, Assume that 
there· are a number of local cooperative firms carrying out marketing 
funct i-pns · for their farmer-members, Then~ further assume that these _ 
local firrns integrate horizontally to. for!T) a ·larger firm to perform the 
necessary marketing .functions more economically so -as to, increase n_et . 
returns to, the Jarmer;;.mem,bers, For ease and clarity of explanation, let 
us assume that. the integrated firm is a federation, The local coopera- .· 
tives. par .the going market price to farmer ... members .. The feperatfon may 
· perfor~_~ddtttonal marketing functions such a~ processing, canning., and 
whole$,ali~go:· The analysi_s before and after the horizontal. integration. 
· is cons_idered in the. remaining part of .this .section- of the study. 9 
Figure 4 shows th.e cost -and revenue curves- {or a. local cooperative 
fi'rm and -~ horizontally-integrated cooperative ffrmwith .economies of 
size ~s~wried·~· ·Spec~:fi.cally, AC~ is the average cost ·,Of the _representa.'.. 
tive·.1ocaLcooper_at.ivefirm, Mc8, is the. respecti.ve marginal cost~ The 
demand cur_ve 'fa~ed by the local cooperative firm is d_esigna.ted _oo,' and 
MR1 is .its marginal revenue, ·ACA is the federated cooperative firm's 
. . . . 
average c~st. ·MtK i$ its res~ective marginal cost, 002 is the 
demand' c'Lirve .facing ,the federated cooperative and represents .. the 
9There is some degree of vertical integration in this _situation, 
which is discussed in the following ~ha~ter, 
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aggregate demand faced by all the local firms before integration. MR2 
is the marginal revenue curve for the federated firm. 
To maximize net returns, production should be at the point of 
int~r~ectior of the firm 1 s marginal cost and marginal revenue curves; 
Befor~ federation (horizontal integration) of the locals, the local 
cooperative would produce ov1 at DCB per unit cost and sell at a price 
of OPB'. After the horizontal integration was effected, the federated 
firm with its larger plant would produce an output equal to ov2 at a cost 
of OCA per unit and sel 1 this output at OBA price per uni L Before 
integration, the individual local cooperative would have only small 
profit of PBtmCB. Consequently there would be a small saving to be 
distributed to farmer-members throµgh·patronage payments. The federated 
cooperative firm would. have greater economic profit. These funds would 
be distributed to farmer-members on a proportional basis. The patronage 
payment of the federated cooperative in Figure 4 is CAPA per unit, and 
this would be greater than the patronage payment of CBPB per unit before 
integration. 
If economies of size exist in an industry, they could be achieved 
through horizontal integration. After integration, ·both the price and 
per unit cost could be decreased, and an incre~se in profit to the 
cooperative farmer-members could be achieved. 
The above model was for a firm operating a single plant and 
f ' ' 1 k t.. f t' l O I th t t' per arming a sing e mar e mg unc ion. n. e nex sec ion, a 
multiplant, horizontally-integrated cooperative firm is developed, 
and its net revenue maximizing situation is analyzed, 
10Appendix C will deal with the multi product firm model. 
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Horizontally~Integrated Multiplant Cooperative Model 
The horizontally-integrated cooperative firm may own a number of 
plants to produce its product. For illustration, assume that a coopera-
tive firm produces its output in two separate plants with a geographic 
separation .between plants. 11 · Assume further that the output (Y) is 
sold in a single market. 
Figure 5 shows the hypothetical multiplant firm's cost and revenue 
curves. AC1 is the average cost of the first plant and MC1 is its 
respective marginal cost. AC2 is the average cost of the second plant, 
2 
and MC 2 is its respective marginal cost, j. MC is the summation of 
l:::: l l 
marginal costs of the two plants (i=l, 2). DD is the demand curve and 
MR is the marginal revenue curve. For profit maximization, marginal 
cost of production in each plant should be equai. 12 · 
The firm produces the amount ov3 and allocates this production 
between the two plants so that ov1 is produced in the first plant and 
OY2 in the second plant. The product is' sold at price OP per unit, 
and profit to the firm is the difference between its total revenue and 
its total costs for both plants. If marginal cost and average cost were 
to decrease in one of the plants, a greater part of the total output· 
would be produced in this plant. The other plant would be kept idle or 
operated at a lower capacity until production levels or costs, or both, 
again made it economical to utilize both plants. 
11 sidney Weintraub, Intermediate Price Theory (Philadelphia, 1964), 
p. 289. . . 
12Appendix B deals with the mathematical approach of multiplant 
firm model, 
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. Economic Effects .of Horizontal · Integration 
A horizontally-.integrated cooperative firm, like any firm, is 
economically efficient when it ,c;an. achieve profit maximizatien. This 
as.sumes the best poss i b 1 e use of resources within. the limitations of 
tne existing plants. The following analysis describes some .of the 
aspects of economic efficiency.involved in a horizontal,ly-integrated 
coopera_tive firm as well as. some of the effects of horizontal. 
i nte,gra ti on .. 
Economies 
Change in Demahd.. The na:ture of demand for. the product faced by 
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, the indiv.idual local c;ooperative firm may be changed by horizontal 
integration. - The demand curve for the product faced by the hori zonta 1 ly- . 
integrated cooperative firm may-be .downward slopi11g because of product_ 
differentiation if the firm is large~· Therefore, the firm could have 
some degree of monopoly power .in .the market'. 
Extensive advertising Of the product may shift the demand curve to. 
the right,- For example, fifty years ago in the Uni.ted S,tates, fruit. 
growers marketed thei.r prqduct; individually and each grower faced ~ •·· 
highly elastic demand cu.rve for his product.· In .the 1930's some of the 
growers formed local cooperatives and the local cooperatives integrc1ted, 
' ' 
ho-rizonta.lly .to form a federated cooperative fruit-marketing firm known 
as Sunk.ist Growers, Incorporated... Since then, the demand for the· 
product has shift~d to the right, in part becau.se of the extensive 
advertising .and sale~ promotions implemented. by the horizontally-
integrated firm. · During the past 35 to 4-0 years, Sunkis~ has invested 
... 
, 
about 68 million dollars for advertising and merchandising fresh 
· '. 13 
oranges, lemons, grapefruit, and processed citrus products. The 
advertising and promoti-0~ have resulted in an increased sales volume 
for the firm .. 
Decreasing Per Unit Cost, One of the most important potential 
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economic effects of horizontal integration is lower per unit costs which 
result from an increase in the size of the firm's plant. Economies of 
size arise because a firm with larger resources has a greater range of 
technological possibilities than a small local firm, 14 For example; 
many items of .capital equipment are available only in very large stzes. 
Hence, the large plants may be composed of qualitatively different and 
tech no log kc\ 11 y more efficient equipment i terns than small pl ants. Al ?0 
as the plant becomes larger, the firm usually can benefit from special i-
zation of labor and management. Exploitation of these opportunities by 
firms .able to develop larger plants results in lower per unit costs. 
Larger plants usually are more efficient than small plants up to the 
optimal scale of plant~ While a large firm may have lower costs up to 
some critical scale of plant, further increases in size beyond th.is 
minimum-o.p:timum scale do not .lead to further increases in efficiency, 15 
13 Irwin W, Rust and Kelsey B, Gardner, Surikist Growers, Inc., Farmer 
Cooperative Service, .U,S, Department of Agriculture, CircularV 
(Washington, 1960), p, 47. · 
14L H, Chamberlin, "Proportionality, Divfsibility, and Economies of 
Scale,11 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, ~cil. JXII (February, 1948), · 
pp. 229-"'2'57. . 
15Minimum-optimum scale of plant means that scale of plant which. 
gives the lowest per unit cost of production and distribution~ It 
indicates the hi.ghest degree of economic efficiency of the firm. · For 
a detailed discus?ion, see Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization, (New 
York, 1959), pp, 145-186, 
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In some industries, the minimum""'.optimumscale of plant.may be 
very large in terms of volume of output.· In _other industries, the 
ma?(imum technolpgical efficiency may occur at a relatively small scale·. 
of -plant •. When .the size of plant and output vo_lume are large, .additional · 
efficiency in terms of reduced costs may occur because of economies 
effected through large volume of distribution and buying. 16 For example,. 
a number of studies _by the Farm Credit Administration showed how local 
cooperatives could integrate to reduce operat-ing costs and increase· 
efficiency. One of these studies indicated that four local packing 
houses. could reduce average pack·ing exRense from $.95 to $.85 per box 
11 h 1 d 1 k. h 17. h" if a the fruit were· and e by one arge pac ·mg · ouse. T is. 
economic gain may be attributed to economies of size made-possible 
through hori~ontal integration.· 
Di seconomi.es 
Change .ill. Supply. Since horizonta·l integration could lower. per 
unit costs, the supply of the product could·_increase which could lea,d 
to a decrease in the product price. The cooperative firm might avoid 
the increase in supply by contr.acts and -o~her limitations-with the 
producers .. It al~o might-reduce the amount of business it did for 
members through the medium _of ·a closed membership policy .. Thus; the 
firm could-initia,te preventi've measures so as to operate on _the optimum 
·scale of plant-and increase the net savings for its members~· 
16G. J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding,_ Reading in Price Theory. 
(Chicago; 1952); pp. 198-232. · · · 
. 
17 J, K. Samuels and George L. Capel, Citrus Packinghouse Costs in 
Cal i-fornia', Farm Credit Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Circular C-138 (Washington~ 1951), p. 12,· 
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Increasing Per Unit Casto According to economi~ theory, certain· 
diseconomies may begin to develop as the size .of the firm expandsj For 
one reason, the firm may become so large that the costs of maintaining 
the organiz~tion in operation, such as executive costs, rise sharply. 
Also the prices of the factors of production, the inputs of the firm, 
may increase as a consequence. of the increased demand .for them on the 
part of the hori~ontally-integrated firm. These diseconomies could 
lead to increasing per unit costs at some size of plant. 
The discussion thus far has dealt with the horizontal integration 
by cooperative firms, the motives for that integration, and its 
economies and diseconomies.. In the following c~apter, the economies of 
vertical integration by cooperative firms is discussed and some· 
illustrations of the United States cooperative experience in this field 
are presented. The possibil.ity of expansion to increase the net income 
for.farmer-members also is discu.ssed. 
CHAPTER IV 
VERTICAL .INTEGRATION BY COOPERATIVES· 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate vertical economic 
integration by cooperative firms.· Cooperatives integrate vertically 
so as to be in a .better position to serve their members. This may be 
in the form of addi tiona 1 services, better services, 1 ower prices for 
farm supplies, higher net prices for farm products, or some combination 
of these factors. Through vertically integrated activities cooperative.s 
may giin some degree of market power and, if marketing economies result, 
make .it possible for farmers to share in these economies. 
Concepts and Definittons. 
A vertically-integrated firm controls the administrative operations 
of two or more economic stages of·production, marketing, or purchasing. 
The term vertical indicates the direction taken by the succession of 
stages in production, processing and marketing farm products or purchas-
.. ing farm inputs. Thus., vertical integration applies to vertical 
structures associated\with internal coordination, and it occurs when a. 
firm combines activities which _are unlike those it currently is 
. . 1 
performing, . 
1Edwin G. Nourse and Horace -B, Drury, Industrial Price Policies 
and Economic Progress (Washington, 1938), p. 70 •. 
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Vertical integration,can be backward or forward. Forward verti ca.l 
integration exists when it is initiated near the raw material stage of 
production and is extended toward the finished product and th~ ultimate 
consumer. Backward vertical integration ex;.sts when it is initiated 
\, 
near the .consumer level and is extended toward the raw material stage •. 
As a working definition, an economic stage in production .is any 
operating process capable of producing a product or a service which can 
be sold .. Such a process may be a part of a longer pfoduction sequenc• 
within a firm. But so long as there is a possibility of separate sale 
associated with a sequence of stages that may be.divided among firms, 
each process may be considered as a .separate stage. ,, 
Motives for Vertical ·Integration 
Maximizina Net Return 
. -
One of the most important mo~ives for·vertical integration through 
cooperative firms is that of maximizing net returns for farmer-members. 
Profit maxim1zat1o~ is based on integration through farmer-owned 
cooperative firms to obtain the·greatest economic efficiency. 
The sign1f1can~e of·vert1ca1 structuring in the economic sectors 
and the re1at1onsh1p between the farming sector and non-farming sectors 
has become more important with the increasing interdependence of agri-
culture and other. industries. Expenditures·for machinery, fertilizer, 
formula feeds~ pesticides, lnd petroleum product, from nonfarm s~ctors 
are expanding with the result that farmers are becoming increasingly 
more dependent on the marketing and purchasing sector of·the economy. 
. . . 
The relatively high prices pa1d by farmers for farm inputs ·and the 
relatively low prices received for their products have. reduced net 
revenue from farming operations •. · 
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Farmers continue to seek methods of increasing the prices they 
receive for their products and of decreasing the prices they pay for 
their inputs. Vertically-integrated cooperatives which are operated 
properly can help farmers in this respect. Through the development and 
use of both ·forward and backward vertically-integrated cooperative firms, 
it_may be possible to organize, coordinate, and control marketing and 
production processes so as-tb obtain increased operating efficiency and 
more power,over,the buying and selling processesi. This could be 
benefi ci a 1 to farmers •. 
Gaining Market Power 
G~ining market power is -an important motive for integrating 
vertically. Market power may be considered-as the ability of a firm 
involved in a particular structural env.ironment to influence price for 
its own benefit. Individually, farmers do not have any significant 
amount of market power-in product and ~esource markets because of the 
competitive market structure for firms handling farm products and 
supplies. Agricultural marketing firms have some degree of market power 
in:non-atomistic situation. Vertical integration through cooperatives 
and the development of differentiated products through processing, 
grading, and special brand names may.enable the cooperative firms to 
gain some market power. 2 This approach has been used by several 
cooperative firms in the United States and will be discussed later in 
this study, 
Vertically-Integrated Cooperative Firm Models 
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The theoretical model. for a profit-maximizing vertically-
integrated cooperative firm can be developed through the use of marginal 
analysis, In the following analysis, the assumption is made that a 
firm is integrated through the three stages of buying raw material, 
processing, arid wholesaling, 
Short-run Model 
Figure 6 depicts the cost and corresponding revenue curves for the 
three successive stages. Specifically, AC1 represents the average cost 
of the raw material plus services necessary to move the product in an 
acceptable form to processors. MC 1 is the marginal cost associated 
~ 
with AC1, Ac2 is the average o~ the combined costs of the first market-
ing stage and the costs involved in the processing stage; MC2 is the 
marginal cost associated with the combined stages. AC3 is the average 
of the combined costs of the first two stages plus the wholesaling 
stages; MC 3 is the marginal cost for the aggredate of the three stages. 
2oiscussing how farmers fare under vertical integration, Mueller 
states: 11 , • , This is largely a matter of relative bargaining power 
among the integrating participants, We should always remember that 
vertical integration alone need not affect this bargaining power. 
Vertical integration per se is neutral with respect to market power. 
Rather, the terms of integration arrangements reflect the relative 
bargaining power of the participants rather than cause it. 11 W. F. 
Mueller, 11 The Economics of Vertical Integration, 11 American Cooperation, }958 (Washington, 1958), p, 724, 
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Figure 6. Cost and Revenue Curves for.the Vertically-
Integrated Firm in the Short-Run. 
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DD is the demand curve for the product faced by the firm. MR is its 
respective marginal revenue., 
The profit-maximizing output is equal to ov1 units, and is 
determined by the intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
of the final stage. The price per unit a~ the wholesale level is OP. 
The average cost of ov1 units is depicted by oc3. The cooperative firm 
has an excess.of revenue over costs represented by c3PLM~ If all net 
savings were distributed to farmer-members, they would receive the 
going market price for their product, 3 plus a patronage payment equal 
to .c3P per unit, 
Long-run Mod.el 
The optimal structure of the firm may not be the same in the long-
run as in the short-run. To determine how many economic stages ar~ 
needed to maximize profits for the firm, a theo.retical · long-run model is 
developed·under the following assumptions: 1) all production factors 
are variable; 2) all output of one stage is used as input in the next 
stage within the firm; 3) fa<:tor prices are held constant. 
Figure 7 shows the long-run average Gost curves for the firm as it 
continues adding stages of production. The average cost (AC1) is the 
long-run average cost,of the first stage. The average cost (AC2) is 
the long-run average combined cost· of the first and the second stages. 
By adding more economic stages, the long-run average costs go up to AC3, 
AC4 and AC5• LC1, LC2, .•. , LC5 represent the levels of the combined 
lowest long-run average cost at which the successive stages can be 
3The farm.product is the raw material for the cooperative firm. 
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Figure 7. Cost and Revenue Curves for the Vertically-Integrated 
Firm .in the Long-Run. 
operated when vertical integration does not exist. The vertical 
distance between LC1 and LC2 represents the lowest average cost of 
operatfng stage 2 without vertical integration. 
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The decreasing part of the long-run average costs reflect the. 
economies of size, As the volume of business increases, more speciali-
zation can be achieved which tends to increase the production efficiency 
and decrease per unit cost, The rising part of the long-run average 
cost reflects the diseconomies of size, As the volume of business 
increases, limitations to the efficiency of management will be 
encountered. Per unit costs of production will increase, 
If the output of one stage is an input in the next stage, the 
vertically-integrated firm can obtain some inputs at a lower cost by 
eliminating the excess profits made by other firms in the industry, A 
vertically-integrated firm producing at stage 3, for example, can obtain 
the product of stage 2 at a price equal to its cost, This will cause 
the long-run average cost to fall below the lowest nonintegrated level 
LC3. 
If vertical integration were carried to the point of adding stage 5 
in Figure 7, the lowest attainable long-run average cost would lie above 
thelowest long-run average cost level lC5 because of the diseconomies 
of vertical integration and higher per unit costs. If LC5 were the 
prevailing level set by competitive pressures, this firm would be 
forced to limit the number of vertically-integrated stages to four. 
Thus, stage 4 would be the highest possible stage of vertical 
integration to be considered by this firm. 
Blaich has argued that as additional vertically-integrated 
processes are considered by the firm, the range of the volume of 
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busines.s that ceuld be conducted by the firm would decrease~4 That is, 
management could operate a firm near .Lc1 costs over a wide range of 
volumes •. As more vertica] integration is involved, the relatively flat 
portions of the.relevant AC curves would decrease because of,coordina-
tion problems of management.· Therefore the AC curves would be flatter 
the lower,the level of integration.· 
The demand curve for each stage would. help in determining the most 
profitable stage for the cooperative firm. In_Figure 7, o1 is the demand 
curve for the product _of stage l -and MR 1 is its respective marginal 
revenue.· o2, MR2, o3, MR3, o4, MR4, o5 and MR5 are described in'the same 
way. MC1, .•. , MC5 are ,the long-run marginal costs of stage l; .. 
• , .5 .. The firm would equate MR; and MC; (where i=l, 2; , •• , 5) to 
determine the volume of business~ price, and profit, By comparing the 
profits on each stage, the firm would determine the most profitable 
stage (i.e., stage four has the largest total profit P4c4L4M4, or P4c4 
profit per uhit) and limit its vertical integration to that stage. This 
stage.maximizes profits ,for this firm. 
Economic Effects of Vertical Integration 
Economies 
Economies of vertical integration arise from at least three sources6 
First; they may come from technological changes which require bringing 
comp 1 ementa ry product ion proces~es together in a single p 1 ant. for . 
efficient operation. There are several examples of this source of 
400. P. Blaich., 11 In.tegration in Theory with Applicatit>n to. Hogs," 
Journal of Fal"ITl Economics, Vol. XLH · (December, 1960) ,' pp. 1280..;1293. 
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economies of vertical integration, In the pear packing industry, the 
use of new technological techniques in the vertical structure reduced 
the per unit cost of production, 5 Dairy coope;atives have used new 
developments in technology to make processing and marketing functi.ons. 
more economical for cooperatives and to increase profits for their 
farmer-members~ The egg cooperatives have used improved equipment to 
grade, pack, and wholesale eggs and thereby increase the net returns 
to their members, 6 
Second, economies of vertical integration may result from 
elimination of expenses of purchase-sale ~ransactions to move goods 
from one ~tage to the next, The vertically-integrated firm processes 
the product- packs it, and sells it to the retailer or,the consumer •. 
But if there were middlemen between the farmer and the processor 
and between the processor.and the retailer, there also must be trans-
act ions between them, Therefore; the vertically-integrated cooperative 
firm would eliminate the expenses of purchase-sale .transactions, 
Third, economies of vertical integration may follow from elimination 
of profits to private suppliers or customer's firms in excess of a.basic 
interest return on the added capital invested. 7 The cooperative firms 
would eliminate the wholesale profits in marketing farm products and 
purchasing farm inputs, Some cooperatives sell most of their products 
5s, G, French, L L Sammet, and R, G, Bressler, 11 Economic 
Efficiency in Plant Operations-with Special Reference ~o the Marketing 
of California Pears, 11 Hilgardia, VoL 24 (Berkeley, 1956), pp. 543-72L 
6R, l, Baker, Integration I9,g_ Production .and Marketing, United 
States Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing Research Report 332 
(Washington, 1959), p. 46. · 
7Bain, p. 156. 
. at the retail leveL · The firms 0 net profit, which is the difference 
between tota 1 revenue and tota 1 cost, is .distributed on the patronage 
basis, Therefore, any middleman's profits which accrued to the firm 
would be distributed to farmer-members, 
Diseconomies 
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Although vertical integration seems economical because it would 
reduce the effects of market transactions, it could involve diseconomies. 
These diseconomies might take the form of hi.gher costs of production, 
processing, and marketing resulting from the necessity of producing 
for oneself what might be purchased more cheaply from other firms or 
operating on the increasing part of the average cost of one or more 
economic stages, 
If the integrated firm could buy products and services from outside 
firms for less than it would spend to produce them, the product would be 
purchased rather than produced, and in such a case, vertical integration 
would not increase costs but would permit the integrated firm to operate 
at lower costs. The .diseconomies of vertical integration also might 
come as .a result of the increasing number of stages performed by the 
firm. Thfa would complicate the managerial funcUons-and increase the 
management cost.· However, the firm could choose the optimum degree of 
integration and the, economical number of stages to gain from economies 
of vertical integration. 
In summary, cooperative firm 1 s motive to integrate vertically 
arises from the prospect of increasing its net revenue by marketing 
farm products or purchasing farm inputs, Cooperatives may increase 
their net revenue by performing succ:essive functions.in production and 
marketing of thefr pr6ducts. 
CHAPTER V 
COOPERATIVE MARKETING FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES. 
Farmers in the United States have worked together because they 
have found that many things could be done better cooperatively than 
through individual action, At first cooperation was informal, but as 
farmers began to produce more farm products than they could consume, 
. 1 they looked to cooperatives to find a market for their products, The 
important objective of marketing cooperative is to maximize the net 
returns or net savings for their members, 
Early Development of Cooperative Marketing of Farm Products 
Since early colonial days, farmers in the United States have viewed 
marketing cooperatives as having an economic advantage over the non-
cooperative firms in certain sectors in the marketing system, However, 
the first period of real growth in the agricultural cooperative move-
ment in the United States came during the depression of 1871-1877, The 
first organization in this period to form group marketing of farm 
products was the Grange, 
The Grange had a great effect on the establishment of farmer 
cooperatives. In the years 1871-76, more than 20,000 local Granges, 
1ward W, Fetrow, Cooperative Marketing of Agricultural Products, 
Farm Credit Administration, Cooperative Division, Bulletin 3 
(Washington, 1936), p, 23, 
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as well as some 26 state agency systems were established. County 
Granges in many cases acted as business enterprises .for members of·the 
local units~ These early Grange movements were active in cooperatiie 
marketing and lessened the distressing consequences .of economic mal-
adjustments. But as the United States recovered from the depression 
of the 1870 1 s, fewer Granges were organized and many cooperative firms 
went out of existence. 
Following the decline of'.the Grange; another farm organization 
called the Farmers Alliance, was organized in ·several areas. Later, 
its locals united and spread over the whole southern part of the United 
States •. Efforts ·Of the Farmers Alliance in cooperative business 
enterprises were ·.simil.ar to those of the Grange. Although short lived, 
the Farmers Alliance during ten years of its most active existence 
placed a great deal of emphasis upon agricultural marketing cooperatives. 
The American Society of Equity began in 1902 in southern .Illinois. 
It sponsored many agricultural marketing cooperatives in the north 
. central part of the United States .. Its efforts were directed mainly to 
marketing ltvestock~ grain, and potatoes. Many local cooperatives.soon. 
began to handle farm products. It established and sponsored several 
cooperative livestock packing plants in Wisconsin, Minnesota; and the 
Dakotas during the period 1913 to 1917, . Many of the 1 ocal cooperatives 
in the Midwest still carry·equity in their names. 
The decade 1910 to 1920 was one.exhibiting stirring changes for. 
agriculture in the United States. The increase in the number of agri-
cultural cooperatives meant shifts in the programs of the state and 
federal agricultural agencies. The system of county agents was 
established. The state and newly organized extension services took 
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over the program of the farmers institutes, The Office of Markets was 
formed in 1913, and its first project dealt with cooperative marketing 
and purchasing, The research and service assistance to cooperatives is 
now administered by Farmer Cooperative Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Many county agents were active in the forma-
tion of local and large~scale agricultural cooperatives, By 1920, there 
were large federations whose members were local cooperatives for market-
ing farm products. Other groups were replacing the local cooperatives 
With branch offices and plants of large-scale centralized cooperatives 
serving an entire producing district or an entire state, Others were 
cooperatives selling in terminal markets. 
The American Farm Bureau Federation was formed in 1919. It set up 
special committees to prepare plans for establishing national marketing 
cooperatives. The committees dealt with livestock, grain, fruits, and 
vegetables. Its operations during the period 1920 to 1925 constitute 
an interesting period in the development of cooperatives by locals in 
the United States, The national cooperatives of grain, livestock, and 
wool have received the greatest consideration by this organization, 
Other farm organizations have also contributed to the development 
of cooperative marketing, The Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union, 
which was organized in Texas in 1902, and the Non-partisan League of· 
North Dakota were effective in getting farmers to work cooperatively 
toward the solution of their problems, The Agricultural Wheel, the 
Brothers of Freedom, and other organizations of lesser historical 
importance were influential in the early cooperative movement in the 
United States, 
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Integration Through Cooperative Marketing 
Important development and growth of size and volume of business of 
marketing cooperatives in the United States can be interpreted largely 
in terms .of the economic environment in which they operate. In an era 
characterized by the trend toward large-scale enterprises and toward 
concentration and control by nonfarming sectors, the cooperative market-
ing firms have attempted to get increased power in the market through . 
integration, Since the movement of Sapiro .in the 1920's, both horizontal 
and vertical integration have been applied by cooperative marketing firms. 
with the view that through cooperative integration and control of a.large 
percentage of farm commodity sales, farmers would be powerful enough to 
achieve the advantage of some monopoly control in marketing, 
Development 
Integration was a dominant idea in many cooperatives formed in the 
1920-1925 period, There were 16 largej centrally controlled cooperatives 
with approximately 50j000 members at the end of 1920, Cooperatives of· 
this type had increased to 74, with more than 879,000 members, by 1926, 
Cotton:i wheat, and milk were the major commodities represented. Member-
ship contracts which could not be canceled over a ten-year period were 
used to ensure that members would deliver their crops, Several large 
cooperatives, active today, were formed during this period. 
The experience of the 11 Sapiro-promoted 11 commodity marketing 
cooperatives demonstrated the weakness of the basic premises of monopoly 
control because cooperatives never obtained control of a percentage of 
any crop sufficient to make an attempt to fix prices, The idea was 
taken up again in 1929 by the Federal Farm Board which endeavored.to 
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form strong -national marketing federations; and it was instrumental in 
assisting in the organizations of .several additional large organizations, 
many of which still are active~ The idea appeared again in the 1960's 
as one of the principle aims of the National Farmers Organization. 
Since 1933, the existing regional federations have added many local 
cooperative membe~s, and many new regional federated organizations have 
been formed through integration. One of the more recent is Associated 
Dairymen, IhGorporated. There are few new independent local associa-
tions, as most of them have found it desirable to join an existing 
regional federation .. · Many of .new local associations which have been 
formed were formed with the assistance of a federated organization .with 
the understanding that they would become a segment of the already 
federated system. 
G~oups of regional federations have made considerable progress in 
financing and operating national organizations. These org~nizations. 
may be thought of as federations, although generally the overhead 
federatfon includes some member organizations of the centralized type. 
The field of cooperative marketing includes such firms as the National 
li~estock Producers Association, the National Federation of Grain 
Cooperatives, the National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, and 
the National Wool Marketing Cooperative. The member associations of 
the national federations reach back to.the farmers who own.and control 
the pr.imary cooperative units. Thus, this national cooperative network 
horizontally and vertically integrates the market and procurement 
operations for the members. 
Cooperatives began to increase the .number of marketing services as 
one means of integration in the period between 1933 and 1945. The 
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result has been increased vertical integration in fruit and vegetables, 
dairy, cotton, grain, poultry, and livestock cooperatives. By 1945·46, 
for example, there were 20 agricultural cooperatives manufaGturing and 
marketing dairy products. and which performed a number or all of the 
market functions in the channels extending from the local plant to the 
consumer. 2 
The period 1945-62 was one of continued substantial cooperative 
growth through integration in the United States. The net volume of 
yearly business increased by more than ~O percent or from $8 billion in 
1945 to $13 billion in 1962. While the number of marketing and purchas-
ing cooperatives declined from approximately 10,000 to 9.039, total 
membership increased from five million to more than seven million 
patrons. The decline in number of firms reflects a tendency toward 
integration and consolidation, especially among the smaller ones. 3 
An Example - Integrated Cotton Marketing Cooperatives 
Farmers have formed GOOperati ve cotton gins and cottonseed oi 1 mi 11 s 
to market their cotton and cottonseed through their own firms. Pro-
cessing cottonseed and marketing the products, however~ involves 
performance of many services not directly connected with the crushing 
operations, .or marketing of products, but which are of real benefit to 
cooperative members. Such services include buying seed and paying 
transportation charges, grading, analyzing seed, and product storing. 
2ward W. Fetrow and R.H. Elsworth, Agricultural Cooperation~ 
the United States, Farm Credit Administration, Cooperative Research 
and Service Division, Bulleti.n 54 (Washington, 1947), p. 57. 
3u.s. Department of Agriculture, Farmer Cooperatives in the United 
States, Farmer Cooperative Service (Washington, 1965), p. 71. 
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The benefits derived from cooperative cottonseed oil mill operations 
are shown by the recent growth in cooperative processing, As late as 
1934, there were -0nly three cooperative mills in the United States. 
Since that time, however~ cotton producers have placed increasing 
importance on this phase of their cooperative activity and by 1960, 
approximately 50,000 cotton farmers were crushing their cottonseed 
through 19 farmer-owned mills, 
The benefits member-patrons have received from cooperative mills 
are indicated in Table III. Returns from cooperative mills and average 
farm prices in sele.cted states during the 3-year period 1957-58 through 
1959-60 as well as the price differential cooperative patrons received, 
are shown for comparative purposes. 
The average investment in fixed assets at cooperative mills during 
this 3-year period was $24.65 per ton of seed crushed, Therefore, 
returns on invested capital (whether borrowed or furnished by members) 
were 13.2 percent in 1957-58; 22,2 percent in 1958-59; and 29.4 percent 
in 1959-60. 4 
The data in Table III show that the price the farmer received for 
cottonseed, including patronage payments, has been substantially higher 
than the average noncooperative farmer's price from cottonseed. The 
advantages to cooperative mill members were $12.77 per ton for Arkansas, 
$18.63 for California~ $11.60 for Mississippi, $16,75 for Oklahoma, and 
$13.99 for Texas in 1959-60 season. 
4Elmer J. Perdue, Crushing Cottonseed Cooperatively, Farmer 
Cooperative Service, U~S. Department of Agriculture, Circular 30 
(Washington, 1962), p. 4o 
Returns To 
TABLE III 
COTTONSEED: AVERAGE FARM PRICES, RETURNS TO PATRONS, 
AND ADVANTAGES TO PATRONS. OF COTTONSEED OIL MILLS,· 
SELECTED STATES, 1957-58.THROUGH 1959-60· 
1957-58 .· . .·· .. 1958-:59 
·Advantage. Returns To Advantage Returns To 
-- ~r959-60 
Cooperative. Average To Coop. Cooperative · Average To Coop. Cooperative Average 
Mi 11 Farm Mi 11 Mill Farm. Mill Mill Farm 
State .·· Patrons. Price Patrons Patrons . Price Patrons Patrons Price · 
Dnllars Per-Torr -
Arkansas 56,61 50 0 60 . 6 .01 52,61 45,00 7.61 50.77 38 0 00 . 
California 70,24 52,80 17 0 44 . 66,37 43.00 23.37 63 0 03 . 44,40 
Mississippi 55.04 50, 30 · 4 0 74. 52,55 47.70 4.85 50.70 39. 10 
Oklahoma 63.39 49,70 13, 69 - 58 .14 41.40 16, 74 5.4.35 · 37,60 
Texas 63.67 51 , 80 . 11 ,87 · 54,62 42.40 12. 22 · 52, 14 38.20 
Average 61. 79 51.04 10.75 57.36 43.90 12.96 54.70 39.46 
-Advantage 
To ~oop, 
Mill 
Patrons 
12 0 77 
18. 63 
11060 
16.75 
13.94 
14.74· 
Source:. Elmer J. Perdue, Crushing Cottonseed Cooperatively, Farmer CooperaHve Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Circular 30 (Washington, 1962),·p, 3. 
O'I 
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The mill 1 s returns to the patron consisted of sales proceeds less_ 
costs incurredo There are variatiqns.among the firms with respect to 
the amount returned by years and between states as shown in Table III, 
Such factors as volume and quality of seed, crushing efficiency, and 
location can materially affect the returns a firm is able to make, 
However, farmers have increased their net returns by integration 
through their own cooperative firms, 
The Southwestern Irrigated Cotton Growers Association, subsequently 
referred -to as SWIG, is an example of a vertically-integrated cooperative 
firm involved in marketing cotton and cottonseed. It follows the 
principles of operating at cost by buying cotton and cottonseed delivered 
by its members and returns to them the net returns above costs, 
SWIG was·organized in July 1926 by the cotton producers in 
irrigated areas of Texas and New Mexico around El Paso, Texas. It is 
incorporated and is owned by its member cotton producers, It is 
managed by a board of directors of five elected peoplei SWIG has a 
cottonseed oil mill, oil refinery, and cotton marketing department, 
The cottoh producer becomes a member after paying the $10 membership 
fee and receives a membership certificate in the coopetative. ·More 
than two-thirds of the total United States production of American-
Egyptian Pima S-1 producers are members of SWIG, 
SWIG planned from the beginning to market cotton and process and 
market cottonseed products, It made a start in 1928 by contracting 
with a commercial oil mill to receive and process cottonseed delivered 
by its members on a profit.,.sharing basis, This arrangement did not 
prove -to be satisfactory since there were no profits after the mi 11 
p~id going prices for seed. An attempt was then made to purchase a 
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minority intere1st in an oil mill o This did not materializeo Finally, 
it became obvious that the only solution was for SWIG to buy or lease 
an oil mill o 
During the 1934-35 and 1935-36 seasons, a local oil mill then in, 
receiversh·ip was·· leased by SWIG and operated for the benefit of its 
members, The operation was successful from the beginningo In June 
1936, the lease was renewed for another five years with an option to 
buy at any time during the period for $60,000o Under this option the 
interests of the minority owners were purchased during the 1937-38 
season and of the majority owners the following yearo 
During the five years of operation under the lease, accumulated 
equities of patrons in the mill exceeded the purchase cost .. At the 
time the title was obtained, the value of the land and machinery exceeded 
$100,000. Net returns. per ton were above prevailing market price. 
This price advantage to members for.the five years while the mill was 
leased averaged $2.06 a ton and totaled $118,161 on 57,450 tons 
cottonseed processed and marketed. 5 
In 1950, SWIG installed a cottonseed oil refinery at a cost of 
$160,000. This gave the firm the advantage of being able to market 
either crude or refined cottonseed oil as relative prices of the two 
products varied. It also made possible better price protection, since 
refined oil is del~verable on future contracts. 
The processing capacity of the oil mill was 165 tons.of seed per 
24 hours in 1960. It operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and usually 
5oti s T. Weaver, Southwestern Irrigated Cotton Growers Association, 
Farmer Cooperat·ive Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Circular 29 · 
(Washingtonf 1962), p. 42. 
9 to 10 months a year. SWIG processed cottonseed into many products. 
The average quanttties of proce$sed products obtained from a ton of 
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cottonseed from the 1959-60 crop are shown in Table IV. These products 
were turned directly or indirectly into produc.ts for many uses including 
food,.household uses, feed for livestock, industrial applications, and 
national defense. 
TABLE IV 
AVERAGE QUANTITIES OF PROCESSED PRODUCTS OBTAINED FROM A TON 
OF COTTONSEED, SOUTHWESTERN IRRIGATED COTTON ~ROWERS 
ASSOCIATION, 1959-60 . 
Product 
Crude cottonseed oil 
Cottonseed meal and cake 
Cottonseed hulls 
Linters, lst and 2nd cuts 
Motes, grabbots 
Milling loss 
Total 
Pounds 
381 
881 
483 
143 
7 
105. 
2,000 
Source: Otis T. Weaver, Southwestern Irrigated 
Cotton Growers Association, Farmer Co6perative 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Circular 
29 (Washington~ 1962), p. 8r . 
SWIG has increased the sales volume of its products in recent years. 
Starting from a low point .with the crop of 1939-40, volume began-a steady 
increase in the early 1940 1s that accelerated rapidly during the l950 1 s. 
Total returns to patrons for both cotton and cottonseed increased from 
$1.8 million in 1939-40 to over $10 million in the late 1940 1 s and early 
1950 1 s, and increased to $27 million for the crop of 1958-59 (Table V). 
Bales of cotton marketed increased from less than 30,000 in 
1939-40 to more than 50~000 in 1949-50, and then more than doubled 
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TABLE v· 
COTTON AND .COTTONSEED: QUANTITIES MARKETED AND NET SALES 
RETURNS TO PATRONS, SOUTHWESTERN-IRRIGATED ·coTTON 
GRO~ERS ASSOCIATION, 1926-27 THROUGH-1959~60· 
Quantities Marketed. Net Sales Returns :To Patrons 
Fi sea 1 Year Cotton C_otto.nseed .Cotton · Cott.on.seed Tota 1 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 . 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935~36 
1936-37 
1937.;.38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 · 
194.3-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948~49 
1949-50 · 
1 ~50-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54. 
1954-55 
'1955-56 
1956-57 · 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
Bales · Tons Dollars. 
2,816 143,000 143,000 
18,017 1,478,000 ---~ 1,478,000 
21 ,914 1,601,836 1,601,836 
35,099 3,057,174 3,057,174 · 
66,5.93 3,424,457 3,424,457 
58,-644 1 ,844,745 1,844,745 
33,930 1,144,-566 1,144,566 
57,486. 3,173,385 3,173,385 
. 51,311. 10,714.6 1,741,687 424,512 2,166;199. 
32;642 6,327i9 2,745,369 225,653 2,971,022 
34,052 11 ,518.4 2,07~,252 508~883. 2,585,135, 
49,689 15,455.6 2i120,.221 358,154 2i505,375· 
33, 146 13,433.2 1,489,913 326,561 1,816,474 
29,950 10,689.0 1,459,879 344,186 1,804,065 
33,786 13,218.2 l,6~4,734 366,541 2,061 ,276 
36,328 15,057.9. 3,825,617 859,249 4,684,866 
41 ,879 14,.330.9 5,072,072 808,008 5,880,080 
35ll90 16,571.1 4,442,900 1,096~500 5,539~400 
33,918 16,707.2 4,164,350 1,118,712 5,283,062 
35,367 18,522.7 4,730,204 1 ,311,367 6,041,571 
39,506 19,056 .. 8 6,829,838 2,482,216 9,312,054 
44,841 20~129.7 8,474,342. 2,781 ,040 11 ,255,382 
54;316 30,655.-2 9,267 ,775 2,435, 177 · 11,702,952. 
50,154 33;702.6 8,.822,798· 2,017,288 10,84Q,086 
36,993 27 ,365 .. 1 9,209,728 3,307 ,335 12,517 ,063 
40,653 32~980.5 ... 8,771,237 2~790,293 11,561 ,530. 
38,566 41,726~5 -7,106,243 3,651,849 10~758,092 
49,956 38,723,2 10,461,066 2,616,-812 13,077,878 
65,659 37,631.5 13,094,712 2,770,058 _ 15,864;770 
73,946 31,666.4 14,493,725 1 ,911,720 16,405,445 .. 
84,777 38,319.7 16,678,111 2,930,824 19,608,935 · 
81,835 38,673.8 16,362,044 2,615,349 · 18,977 ,393 .. 
122,.533 · 45,755.6 · 24,335;196. 2,562,780 26,897,976 
111,658 50,485~3 21,711,164 2,790,035 24i501,199 · 
Total 1,63_7,150 649,418.5 227,048,341 45,438,102 272,486,443 
. Source: Otis T. Weaver, Southwestern Irrigat~d Cotton _Growers . 
Associati.on, Farmer Cooperative Service, 0.S~ Department of. Agric~l-
ture, Circulc!,r 29 ·(Wash.ington, 1962), p. _51. · 
by 1960, The tonnage of cottonseed processed showed similar 
increases, 
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SWIG paid the producers the prevail i ng prices paid by other mi 11 s 
at the time member-producers delivered their cotton, At the end of 
the fiscal year, the members received their shares of the net returns 
to the cooperative as patronage payments, 
The net return to members averaged $9,83 a ton on cottonseed over 
the 26-year period .. The mill has returned to patrons a total of 
$6,385, 189 on 64.9,418,5 tons of cottonseed processed (Table VI), In 
terms of price per ton, SWIG members received over the 26-year period 
an average.return of.$69,97 or 16,3 percent more than the $60.14 
average prevailing market price, 
Net· .returns to members of more than $40 per ton for the crops of 
1946-47 and 1947-48 were abnormally high, They represented the benefits 
that member-producers received, as owners of the marketing cooperative 
during a period of advancing cottonseed prices following the removal of. 
the price control.s after World War II~ 
During a recent three~year period, 1957-59, net returns paid to 
members averaged $7,69 per ton above the market price for cottonseed 
in the area and totaled more than $1,000,000 on the 134~915 tons 
marketed by members, This additional amount received by SWIG members 
was·an average return of about 59 percent on the $701,952 net worth 
investment in the oil mill plant, For the crop of 1959, the additional 
net returns ·received ~by the members represented a 65.7 percent return· 
on the net worth of the ofl mill plant, Therefore, the integrated 
marketing cooperative .increased the net returns through patronage 
refunds for its members, 
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TABLE VI 
COTTONSEED: PRICES AND NET SALES RETURNS TO PATRONS 
OF SOUTHWESTERN IRRIGATED COTTON GROWERS 
ASSOCIATION, 1934 THROUGH 1959 
Tons Prices Paid Net Sales Returns 
Crop Year Marketed Per Ton·Bt Jo Patrons 
SWIG Others Per Ton Total Amount 
Tons. Dollars .. 
1934 10,714,6 39062 37.45 2, 17 23 ,251 
1935 · 6,327.9 35.66 33.31 2.35 14,871 
1936 ll,518,4 44 0 18 35.57 8. 61 99~173 
1937 15,45506 24092 23082 L 10 17,001 
1938 13,43302 24031 27.00 2o69 36,135 
1939 10,689.0 32.20 26023 5 0 97 . 63,813 
1940 13,21802 27073 23;50 4.23 55,913 
1941 15,057.9· 57006 51070 5o36 80,710-
1942 14,33009 56038 51.62 4. 76 · 68,215 
1943 16,571.l 66 .17 57.29 8.88 147,151 
1944 16,707.2 66.96 63000 3.96 66 9161 
1945 18,522.7 70.80 62,97 7,83 145,033 
19,46 19,05608 130 0 25 85.95 44 0 30 . 844,216 
1947 20,129,7 138 0 16 96, 27 - 41089 843,233 
1948 30,65502 79,44 77 ,50 1. 94 59,471 
1949 33,70206 59,86 44.00 15.86 534,523 
1950 27 ,365, l 120.86 98.24 22.62 618,999 
1951 32,980.5 84,60 - 79;39 5.21 171,828 
1952 41, 726 ,4 87.52 76.74 10. 78 449 ,811 
1953 38,723.2 67.58 59,49 8.09 - 313,271 
1954 37,631,5 73,61 64000 9,61 361 ,639 
1955 31;666.4 60,37 53,00 ,7.37 233,381 
1956 38,31907 76,48 72,00 4,48 171 ,672 
1957 38,673,8 67.63 64 .13 3.50 135,358 
1958 45,755,6 56 ,01 46050 9. 51 435,136 
1959 50,485,3 55026 46000 9,26 767,494 
Total Or 
Average 659,418.5 69.97 60. 14 9,83 6,385,189 
Source: Otts To Weaver, Southwestern Irrigated Cotton 
Growers Association, Farmer Cooperative Service, UoS, 
Department of Agriculture, Circular 29 (Washington, 1962), 
p O 53 0 
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Growth in Cooperative Marketing of Farm.Products 
The proportion of marketing business done by marketing cooperatives\ 
is one measure,of the importance of cooperative marketing in th_e economy.· 
Available data, in -dollar terms; indicate that about 25' percent of all 
farm products in Un_i ted States move through cooperatives, This ranges 
from highs of 90 percent for cranberries and 70 percent for Florida 
and Arizona ci:trus. to a low of ·5 percent for broilers and tobacco. ·· The 
proportions.handled by cooperatives. in 1964 for other commodities were 
as follows~ dairy products, 65 percent; grain, 40 percent; cotton and 
related products,, 25 perc;:ent; fruits and vegetables, 25 percent; woo1 
and_ mohair, 20 percent; turkeys, 19 percent; livestock, 13 percent; 
6 
and eggs, 10 percent, 
The growth of cooperatively marketed farm products has been 
substantial.· Available data in index number form. indicate that, from 
1950-51 to 1962-63, the net-value of farm products marketed through 
cooperatives has increased along with the total cash receipts by all 
farmers •. · These index numbers, dev_eloped and used by the Farmer 
Cooperative Service,7 are presented in columns (1) and (3) in Table VII. 
Comparison of the two indexes indicates that the net value of farm 
products marketed th~ough cooperatives.increased at a faster rate than 
, 
the total cash receipts by farmers in the same.period. This is shown 
graphically in Figu_re 8. Since 1956, the index of marketings through 
6Martin A. Abrahamsen, Coeperatives Today,andTomorrow,_Farmer 
Cooperative ·Service, U~S •. Department of Agric-u tu.re, Information 52-
{Washington,· 1966), p. 7. . · 
7Martin Ao_ Abrahamsen, "Cooperative Trends Show Progress, 11 News . 
for Farmer. Cooperatives, Farmer Cooperative· _Servi.ce, US. _Department · 
of Agritulture (March, 1965), p. 4 •. 
TABLE VII 
INDEXES AND FIRST DIFFERENCES OF INDEXES OF NET VALUES OF 
COOPERATIVELY MARKETED FARM PRODUCTS, AND OF TOTAL 
RECEIPTS BY ALL FARMERS, 1950-51 -THROUGH 1962-1:>3_ 
· · rrrnex-0r'Net . . . -· - Index Of 
Cooperative · First Difference Receipts Of· First Difference 
Period Marketing Value 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953.;.54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956..;57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
l 960-61-
1961-62 
1962-63 
13-year average 
base period for 
(l) 
Y1 
76ol 
8802 
88.0 
87.7· 
88,8· 
89.6 
95.6 
99.4 
108,8 
11L5 
115. l 
121 . 5 
129 .5 
Of Column(l)··. All Farmers 
(2) (3) . 
v, Y2 
89.6 
12. 1 l 02. 2 
- 0:2 100.8 
1.3 97.8 
Ll 94. 1 
0.8 91.1 
6,0 95 .1 
3~8 92.9 
9.4 104·, 0 
2.7 104. 2 
3.5 l 05 .8 
6.4 109 .8 
8.0 112.4 
index 100.0 lOOoO 
Of Column (2) 
(4) 
'\f 
. '2 
12,6 
- l . 4 
- 3. 0 
- 3. 7 
-_3,0 
4.0 
- 2. 2 .. 
12. 1 
0.2 
L6 
4.0 
2.6 
Source: Martin A. Abrahamsen, "Cooperative Trends .Show Progress, 11 News For 
Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer ~ooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agricultu~ 
(March, 1965) , p. A . . '-I 0 
Index 
Numbers 
130 . 
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110 
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70 
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Figure 8 .. Indexes of Net Value of Cooperatively Marketed Farm 
Products and Total Cash Receipts of Farmer$, 
United States, 1950-51 Through 1962-63. 
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cooperatives has been higher than the index. of total cash receipts of·· 
a 11 f &rmers in the United States. 
A ltnear regression equation using time (T) as the .independent 
variable was computed for the index of marketings through cooperatives. 
(y1) and for the index of·total marketings {y2) .. 
The results are as follows: 
72.43 + 3.94 \ 
{o31) 
Y2t = 90.92 + 1.29 Tt {.38) 
2 . R =.0.489 
(5.1)· 
(5.2) 
The standard errors of the regression coefficients are shown in 
parentheses below the coefficients. Based on the student t .test, the 
trend coefficient.for marketings through cooperatives is significantly 
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level~ It indicates 
that the index of cooperatively marketed farm products in.creased an 
average of·.3.9 points each year .. Abqut 93 percent of the variation 
in ~ooperative marketings. was associated with the trend. 
The upward trend in the index of total marketings-was lower,and 
less consistent than the trend in cooperatively marketed products. 
Nevertheless., the coefficient -is significantly different from zero at 
the 95 percent confidence level. The coefficient indicated an annual 
change in the marketings of-1 .3 points, but the percentage of variati.on 
associated with trerid was less than 50 .. 
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The two trend CO!:!ffic:ients, B,1 and s21 were tested to determine 
whether or not they might have come from the same popul a ti.on .. · For this 
test, -the calculated tis distributed as the _student t-with n1 + n2 - 4 
8 degrees of freedom~, 
where S~ is the pooled variance clefined as 
*2 . " *" * *2 A * * E Y1t - Bll 'i: tlt ylt + Y2t - 821 . I: t2.t Y2t 
n, -+ n2 - 4 
* * where Yt and tt r~present deviation of the variables Yt and Tt from 
their means, y and T~ respectively, n1 = n2, and t = J,2, .... n~ 
The .calculated student t-value was 5.19 which indicates that the 
trehd coefficients of equation (SJ) and (5.2) are different at 95 percent 
confidence:level_~ -- Therefore, the estimates of trend co~fficients are 
statistically different from·each other.· The conclusion based on both 
tests, is that the index of·cooperatively marketed farm products in-
creased at a greater rate than the index. of total marketings of· farm 
products , in the period 1950-1963 in the. United States~ 
First differences can be used.to remove the influences of trend-
from·data. First differences of the data for the period 1950-51 through. 
8Robert Go D. Steel and. James H .. Torrie, Princi.eles and Procedures 
of Statistics (New York, 1960), p. 173. 
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1962~63 were used in a statistical model to estimate the interrelation~ 
ships exfsting between changes in total marketings and changes in 
marketings through cooperatives. 
where 
The statistical. model is as follows: 
(5.3) 
v1t = first differences in successive years (ylt - Yit-l) of the. 
index. numbers .of the net-value of cooperatively marketed 
farm.products. 
v2t.= first difference (y2t - y2t_1) of the index numbers_ 
of the tota 1 cash receipts of a 11 farm products. 
a1 and b1 = parameter$ of -the linear. equation. 
u = error term 
t = time designation. 
The value of-b1 would be expected to be different from zero. In 
fact, a coefficient of unity indicating an approximate 1:1 relationship 
between the. first differences, would be .expected if cooperative marketing 
firms were experiencing the same growth and variability patterns as· 
existed for all farm marketing firms .. 
The least squares estimates of equation (5.3) were obtained by 
regression analysis. The results are as follows: 
A 
Yl = 3.33 + .66 Y2 
COB) 
The number contained in parentheses beneath the estimated 
coeffici_ent for Y2 is the standard error-.of the coefficient. The. 
(5.4) 
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coefficient has a significant t-value at the .05 level which indicates 
that .it is different from unity. All signs were consistent with the. 
theoretical framework of the model, and R2 for the equation is .. 86. 
The co.efficient is interpreted in the Jo 11 owing manner. As the 
first difference of the index number of the total cash receipts of all 
farmers in the United States increased by one unit, the first difference 
of the index numbers of cooperatively marketed farm products increased 
by .66 of one unit. The fact that the coefficient reflects a less than 
1:1 relationship is indicative that only part of the growth in marketing 
through cooperatives can be attributed to changes in aggregate sales of 
all farm products by farmers. 
Most ~f the growth in cooperative marketing apparently was 
independent of changes in total marketings. During the first half~f 
the period, 1n ,fact, the first differences for cooperative marketings 
were positive while the first differences for total marketings were 
negative. In other words, cooperative marketing continued to show an 
increase even though total marketings were declining. During the last 
half of the period, both series showed increases with the largest 
increases generally associated with the series representing cooperative 
marketing. 
Distribution of Net Savings 
Marketing cooperatives operate on the basis of service at cost. 
Since it is not possible to operate so as to anticipate the exact cost, 
they accomplish this by returning net savings at the end of the fiscal 
year .. Allocation of-net savings may be based on the value or on the 
number of units handled. For example, a farmer who delivers 10,000 
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bushels.of wheat to his cooperative has contributed ten times as much 
to the business~s the farmer who delivers only 1,000 bushels. If the 
net saving amounts .to three cents.per bushel, th~ farmer who delivers 
10,000 bushels is entitled to $300 refund, anq the farmer who delivers 
1,000 bushels is entitled to $30. 
Over the years, one regional grain cooperative, ·operating in a very 
competi ti-Ve industry, has returned· an extra three cents per bushel to 
its members or an estimated $60 million more than would have received 
if the members had not started their own.marketing cooperative. This 
cooperative is the Farmers Union Grain Ter'1)inal Association which 
was formed in 1938 at St. Paul, Minnesota, with $30,000 member capital.; 
In 1962; it ha.d grown to the· extent tha_t it had $42 mi 11 ion in member 
capital. 9 
In the United States, at the end of fisGal year 1962; the combined 
net savings of-2.17 regional marketing .cooperatives,. was·about $174 
million. This net-saving was distributed as shown in Table VIII. 
Approximately.93.5 percent of the $174 million after taxes was.dist~i~ 
buted as patronage payments, They paid 1.1 percent of the savings as. 
federal and,state taxes. Then they paid 57.2 percent of the net· 
savings in c~sh to member patrons on the basis .of the current .year I s 
business, Many of·the regional marketing cooperatives.paid dividends 
on capital stock and Cqpital equities. The aggregate value was 
equivalent to 5~0 percent of net savings in 1962, · 
9Kenneth J, Samuels, Increasfog the Marketing Strength of Farmers, 
Farmer Cooperativ~ Service,. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Tnformat,on . 
43 {Washingtont 1964), p. 15. 
TABLE 'VI II 
DISTRIBUTION OF NET SAVINGS OF 217 REGIONAL 
MARKETING COOPERATIVES, FISCAL YEAR 1962 
Percentage Of Net Savings Distributed As~- . 
Total Net - · · · · 
Clas~ification Number Savings Patronage Refunds 
Of · Of Before Dividends And On Current Year's Unallocated 
Cooperatives Cooperatives Taxes - Interes·t ,On-- - . _ Business Reserves Income Taxes, 
_ Other 
Common Preferred Equity Paid In 
Stock _Stoc_k _Capital. Cash Allo_cated ~- F~ct~Y'al _State 
(l ,000 l. Per ·Cent. ( Do 11 a.rs) _ 
Marketing 217 173 ,-645 LB 1.2' 2.0 57.2 36,3 0,4 1.0 
Centralized 113 85,510 2,3 1.2 2 ,_8 56 ~5 - 36.2 0,5 0.5 
Federated 77 69. 777 1.6 1.2 LO 65.4 28.3 0.7 ,. 7 
··Mixed-Membership 27 18,358 0.2 Ll 2 .. 5 · 29.;:0 67;6 0.8 0.-4· 
-
(3) Less than 0.05 percent 
Source: Nelda Griffin, Financial Structure of Regional Farmer.Coo erati;ves, Farmer Cooperative 
Service,. U~S. Department of Agriculture, General Report·l33 (Washington, 196€>_, p. 40 •. 
0, 1 · 
(3) 
0, l 
(3) 
'-I 
..,..,. 
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In summary, thE)se regional cooperatives make savings from 
manufacturing, processing, and wholesaling farm products. These .. 
savings mean that the cooperative members share the net revenue in the 
\ vertical stages of the marketing sy.stem. These net revenues or savings 
go to the members and increase their net returns., 
CHAPTER Vl 
COOPERATIVE PURCHASING FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Farmers in the United States have·formed purchasing cooperatives, 
to buy the farm inputs they need. The main objective of these firms 
is to sh.are net revenues among farmer-members on the inputs purchased 
by farmers •. 
Early Development of ·Cooperative Purchasing 
Cooperative purchasing firms began in the United States around 1850 
in Illinois-and Wisconsin~ The early farm. organizations made contribu-
tions.toward establishing this type of.cooperative as well as the 
marketing and. service cooperativesi The Grange was particularly active 
just after the Civil War .. Purchasing agents were established to assemble 
o~ders and place them with dealers.who shipped the farm supplies 
directly to farmers at .special prices. After 1875, Grange farm supply 
. 1 
and general warehouse stores were formed throughout the United States. 
However, some of·the stores lasted only a few years. 
The Farmers .Alliance established many purchasing cooperatives 
between 1880 and 1890. · The A l1 i ance I s interest was short. lived because 
1R. H. Elsworth, Agricultural Cooperative Associ.ations, Marketing 
and'.Purchasing, Uo,S. Department of Agriculture, Tech. Bulletin 40 . 
(Washington, 1925), p. 98. • 
79 
80 
organization soon turned to political action as a means of securing 
relief for-farmerso. For several years during the middle 1890 1s, 
purchasing cooperatives presented few opportunities for savingso Many 
merchants-were in financial distress, competition was keen, and margins 
were smallo 
The American Society of Equity, formedin 1902, also sponsored 
purchasing as well as marketing cooperatives. In -1902, the Farmers 
Union was organized whiGh helped in establishing purchasing cooperativeso 
It was one of ·the few organizations which stressed-the faGt that effi-
cient buying wa_s of ·-as much importance to the farmer as -efficient 
selling. - The Farmers Union helped organize production supply coopera-
tives along the modern pattern to produce and handle farm inputs for 
farmer-members, The Farmers Union, either directly or through .a 
subsidiary company, made con.tact with selling agencies in order to 
achieve the advantages of car-lot buying of such supplies as mill feeds, 
flour; coal, ·fence posts, and .other input commodities. 
During the period from 1901 to 1920 approximately.2,250 farm 
' 
supply cqoperatives were organized .in tha United States, with over 
half of these formed in 1916-20 period. Several regional farm 
purc;hasing _cOoperatives .organized during this period are .still 
operatingo For example, the Fruit Growers Supply Company in .Los 
Angeles was organized in 1907 to provide containers and packing 
materials for citrus growers in California; the Farmers-Union State 
Exchange in Omaha, Ne~raska, was organized in 1914 to serve both 
farmers and local cooperatives; Central Cooperative Incorporated in 
Superior, Wisconsin, was organized in 1917 to serve.local c;ooperatives 
in northern Wisconsin and Minnesota.areas; Eastern State Farmers 
Exchange Inc~ (now Agway, Inc., Syracuse) in West Springfield, 
Massachuse.tts, was organized in 1918 to serve farmers through branch 
warehouses and a car-door distribution system; and the Cooperative 
Grange League Federation Exchange Inc~, was formed in 1920. 2 
One of th.e factors which had encouraged the rapid development of 
buying farm supplies cooperatively was the success experienced in 
making savings from the wide margins existing at that time. During 
World War I, food.production and use of production supplies expanded 
rapidly. 
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Price declines following World War I caused the failure of several 
general supply cooperatives that had overexpanded. As a result, the 
number.of active supply cooperatives declined slightly until th.e latter 
1920 1 s. This was offset to some extent, however, by a number of·· 
marketing cooperatives adding supply services. The adverse economic 
conditions facing the farmers during the 1920 1 s, coupled with the 
growing trend toward mechanized and commercial agriculture, caused 
another increase in the number of farm supply cooperatives around 1928. 
The Farm Bureau Federation provided a stimulus to cooperative 
. purchasing in the 1920 1 s. County and.State Farm Bureaus first served 
their,members by using an agent system in purchasing carloads of 
supplies. In other cases they bargained with local dealers for price 
concessions or discounts for their members. Many Farm Bureau coopera-
tives .were organized and they, in turn, formed state wholesale supply 
associations. These were most.active in the Central and Southern parts 
of the United States .. 
2Joseph G. Knapp, Seeds that Grew, A History of the Cooperative. 
Grange League Federation Exchange (New York, 1960), p. 35. 
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2,65Z; .they ,had 980,000 members and a volume of bustness. of about $369 . 
mill ion,. ' 
Some.of the regional. firms. org.anized during the 1930 1 s, with dates 
in parentheses., were: Farmers Union CentraJ Exchange; Inc,, .St .. Paul,· 
Mi'nne_sota (193l); Pacific Supply Co()peratives, Portland, Oregon {1933); 
Pennsylvania Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, Har:risburg {1934); 
Farmer 1 s Cooperative Exchange, Inc., Raleigh, _North Carolina, (1934); 
and National Cooperatives, Inc., Albert Lea; Minnesota (1933). 
World War Il and post-.war conditions stimulated the organization . 
of additional supply cooperatives, Some of these were established 
eifher to manufacture supplies .or -to;give ,farmers more d~pendable 
sources of supplies. Th~ shortage of supplies existing at. times during; 
this period caused a rapid increase in manufacturiflg, in membership, and 
in _volume of -cooperative purchasing.· 
Many regiona_l cooperatives added fertilizer. plants and feed plants, 
and many .bought ·oil_ re-fi.neries. For eX:ample, the Midland Cooperative. 
purchased a refinery at·Cushing, Oklahoma, in 1943. 4 Regional wholesale 
associations to.handle -feed and other supplies were organized in 
Missouri, Arkansas; and Tennessee .. _ The ~ati anal Cooperative Refin~ry 
Association was. organized in 1943 and purchased an existing plant at. 
McPherson, Kansas. Ass.ociated Cooperati-ves Jnc., Sheffiel.d, Alabama,. 
also was formed in 1943 to purchase fertiJiz~r for local and regional_ 
cooperatives,. Select Seed Inc., Ft~ Wayne, Indiana, was set up by 
regional cooperatives in 1947·, Missi.ssippi Cotton Growers ·invested 
4Jerry Voorhis, Americ<!,n Cooperati,v~s (New York, 1961), p. 104. 
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some $4 million in Mississippi Chemical Corporation and built the first 
farmer owned nitrogen plant in Yazoo City in 1948~ During the period 
from 1941 through 1950 15 other small regional wholesale cooperatives, 
were formed. Many were set up to manufacture only one or two farm 
supply items. 
By 1951, a total ·Of 3,282 production supply cooperatives with 2.9 
million members had over $1.9 billion of gross business and $1.1 billion. 
net, excluding inter-cooperative volume: In addition, ,about 3,399 
marketing and 100 service cooperatives .handled another $800 mill ion of 
gross,supply busihess ($600 million on a net basis after eliminating 
duplication of intercooperative business). 5 
Supply cooperatives continued to progress in ~he 1950 1 s, 
Integration of functions, use of research, diversity of services, and 
net savings .for farmers a 11 increased. These cooperatives continued 
to adjust to rapid changes in agriculture. They addecl a wider variety 
of supplies, especially pesticides, animal health products, liquid 
nitrogen, and building supplies. 
Many associations further integrated their operations on a vertical 
basis. They built new:automated feed mills and seed processing plants. 
Several cooperatives handling broiler .and turkey feed began contract 
production programs. They spent large sums in modernizing the larger 
oil refineries and sold the small.er ones. 
Regional associations.have organized national fertilizer 
cooperatives. They built several new nitrogen plants requiring heavy 
5Bruce L Swanson, Statistics ·Of Farmer Cooperatives, 1962-63? 
Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, General 
Report No. 128 (Washington, 1965), p. 3. · 
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capital outlays, adqed granulating equipment to dry ferti_lizer plants, 
and built bulk-blending plants. They started mining and processi~g 
phosphate -rock .in the West, acquired the stock·of·a potash company, and 
both invested ·in .and contracted with, nitrogen manufacturing 
. organizations o . 
A number of regional cooperatives-made an important advance when 
they arranged to share in the costs and results of-several feed research 
and testing farmso Several region~ls also established a resaarch farm 
for forage .seeds, anq three firms in the East _joined in a cooperative. 
hybrid seed corn project'.· 
·Farmers also·looked t~ their cooperatives for more related ser~ices. 
such as feed grinding and mixing, bulk feed -delivery, seed cleaning, 
fertilizer spreading, and paint sprayingo There were serious requests 
that the supply cooperatives-add marketing services~ 6 An increasing 
number of farmers expected accommodation credit and seasonal fi.nancingo 
Interest in mergers increased among .both-local and regional !Supply 
associations in the l950 1 s, although relatively few such mergers had. 
occured .by 19630- Western Fertilizer Association-, Seattle, Washington, 
merged with Central-Farmers Fertilizer Company, Chicago, in 1958. 
Illinoi.s Farm Supply Company, Bloomington, and Farm Bureau Service 
Company, of Des Moines, integrated to become Farm Supply Services, 
Incorporated, Bloomington, Illinois, in 1962. 
The regional supply and grain marketing cooperatives in Indiana 
and Michigan merged .in each state in 1949 and .1962 respectively. 
6u.s~ Department of Agri!=ulture,. Major Regional Cooperative Handling 
Su lies, 1962-6~, Farmer Cooperative Service, General Report No. 125 · 
Washingto'n;T9q5), P~· 950 
Eastern States Farmers Exchange, Incorporated, Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and Grange League Federation Exchange, Incorporated, 
Ithac~, New York, merged to fQrm Agway, Incorporated, Syracuse, New 
York, to provide their members .better services, 
An Example - l!:!,t~gra ted Cooperative Purchasing 
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Farmland Industries Incorporated, with headquarters in Kansas City, 
is an integrated purchasing cooperative firm. 7 It was organized in 1929 
with the primary objective of maximizing profits for its memberso It 
controls and manages its individual plant, subsidiaries8 and wholesale 
firms, Its member-cooperatives are .located throughout Iowa, ·Kansas, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Colorado, Oklahoma; South Dakota, Wyoming, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Arkansas, and Texasi 
The record of the Farmland Industries shows that sales in fiscal 
year 1929 included 2,976 thousand gallons of refined fuel and petroleum 
gas, 135 thousand gallons of lube oil and 74 thousand pounds of grease, 
It had 22 member~cooperatives and the gross sales were $309,8910 9 Since 
that time,. it has followed a policy of expansion through conglomerate 
integration by adding more farm supplies~ In 1935, it ha.ndled tires and 
in 1940~ it began handling auto partso It added plants in 1950 1 s for 
manufacturing feed and.chemical fertilizerso 
7It was Consumer Cooperative Association (CCA} until September, 
1966. 
8A subsidiary is defined as a partially or wholly owned and 
controlled cooperative or noncooperative by the holding firmso 
9 Farmland Industries, Inc?, 38th Annual Report (Kansas City, 1966), 
p. 36. 
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The membership of Farmland Industries .had increased to 1,693 local 
cooperatives by 1955, with gross sales of $93,623,993 and net savings 
for members amounting to $2,534,423. Farmland Industries continued to 
grow by expanding its operation in purchasing, processing, and 
manufacturing farm supplies for distribution at the wholesale level to 
retail farmer cooperatives. In 1966 it was engaged direc~ly in manu-
facturing fertilizer., fee.d, grease, -batteries, paint, and fabricated 
steel products. Four supply subsidiaries which produce crude oil, 
refined. fuels, lube oils, fertilizer and soybean meal, were merged with 
Farmland in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. 
Sales in the fiscal year 1966 were 696,730 tons of feed, 1 ,333,009 
tons of fertilizer, 969,769 gallons of,refined fuels and lfght petroleum 
gases, and 489,840 gallons of paints. Approximately 70 percent of the 
total commodities supplied patrons in 1966 were produced by Farmland 
and its subsidiary plants and 10 percent by other cooperative plants. 
Gross ·sales in fiscal year 1966 were $330,131,036 with. net savings of 
$23,328,253. 
Farmland Industries prices its products according to the going 
prices, in th,e market,. For most of the products, an oligopoly market 
situation prevails, and Farmland is interested in maintaining a profit 
margin for each product .so that a significant cash patronage refunds 
can bei paid to. its members.·- In 1964, for example, it sold.fertilizer 
for $71.84 per ton to the local cooperatives and it refunded $7.39 per 
ton to the local cooperatives as patronage refunds. In 1965, the price 
of fertilizer was $70.84 per ton and patronage·refunds totaled $8.52~ 10 
1°Farmland Industries, Inc., Annual Stockholder Notification Report, 
1964-.§§.. (Kansas City, 1966), P~ 12. 
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The volume of fertilizer in~reased from 858,~50 tons in 1964 to 997,659 
tons,in 1965. 11 In 1966, a reJativeJy large decrease :in price occurred 
as a result.of the incr,ease in the supply of fertilizer produced by 
· Farmland and the other. firms in the market~ The decrease in price was 
from $70.84 per ton in 1965 to $67,51 per ton in 1966. However, this 
was accompanied by artincrease:in the volume sold up to 1,333,009 tons. 
The :patronage refund per ton declined to $6.9·3. 
There has been a reduction in the per unit cost of fertilizerq. 
From: 1965 ·to 1966, for example, the. price decreased by $3.33 per ton 
but the refunds decreased by only $1.59 per ton of fertilizer. There-
fore, the net.price declined. by $1.74 per ton. 
The experience ·Of Farmlan_d Industries, Inc. s.upports the conclusion 
that·integration.by cooperative firms, horizontally and vertically, can 
offe,r lower prices to farmers and a share of the middleman's profits as 
patronage refunds,to its members. 
Grow.th in Coop.erative Purchasing of Farm Supplies. 
Purchasing cooperatives in the Un.ited States have made progress 
and hav.e experienced growth since 1950~ They handled, in dollar. tet'ms, 
17~7 percent of·all farm SL!pplies in 1950-51. By 1963-64; farmer-members 
obta.ined: 20 percent of all farm supplies and equipment from purchasihg 
cooperatives (Table IX). The proportions in 1963-64-for individual: 
products wer.e: 29 percent for fertilizer, 27 -percent for petro 1 eum 
products., 21 percent for seed, 17 . percent for feed, and 2 percent for. 
farm machif'lery and equipment. 
11 Farmland Industries, Inc., Wr~kly Wholesa.le Volume Report~ Annual 
Summary, 1964-65 (Kansas City, 1966 , p. 18~ 
TABLE IX 
FARM SUPPLIES: PERCENTAGES OF SELECTED GROUPS OF INPUTS 
PURCHASED FROM COOPERATIVES, UNITED $TAtES, 1963-64 
Item 
Feed 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Petroleum Products 
Farm Machinery and Equipment 
All Other Supplies 
Total 
Percent of Farm Supplies . 
17 
21 
29 
27 
2 
15 
20 
·$ource: Martin A. Abrahamsen, 11 Cooperative Trends 
Show Progress,'' News for Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer 
Cooperative Serv"fc'e; U.S. Department of Agriculture (May, 1966), p. 4. 
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Both the net value of farn, supplies purchased through cooperatives 
and the total expenditures for these supplies have increased during the 
period 1950-51 through 1962-63 (Table X). However, the net value of 
cooperatively purchased farm supplies increased at a faster rate. 12 In 
only one year, 1957-58, was a decrease reported for the index of 
cooperatively purchased farm supplies. In contrast, decreases were 
reported in five of the 12 years for the index of total expenditures. 
Trends during the 13-year period, 1950-51 through 1962-63, of 
cooperatively purchased farm supplies {y3) and total expenditures for 
the same suppl 'ies for all farmers (y4) were estimated using time (T) as 
the independent variable. The results are as follows: 
Y3t = 76,77 + 3.32 Tt ( , 21 ) (6' 1) 
12Martin A. Abrahamsen, "Cooperative Trends Show Progress," News. 
for Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Department. 
of Agriculture (March, 1965), p. 15. 
TABLE X 
INDEXES AND FIRST DIFFERENCES OF INDEXES OF-NET VALUES OF COOPERATIVELY 
PURCHASED FARM SUPPLIES, AND OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES. 
OF ALL FARMERS, 1950-51 THROUGH i962-63 
Index Of Net Index of Cash. 
Cooperative First Difference· Expenditures Of First Difference. 
Period. Supply Value Of Column'-( 1) All Farmers Of Column (3) 
( 1) (2) (3) ( 4) 
Y3 Y3 Y4 Y4 
1950-51 76 .. 8 97.7 
1951-52 · 87.8 11.0 97;0 - • 7 
1952-53 91 .8 4.0 93.0 -4.0 
1953-54 . 90.2 -1.6 9l.O -2.0 
1954-55 92.2 2.0 91.8 .8 
1955-56 93.3 1. 1 90.5 · -1.3 
1Q56-57 97~8 4.5 93.9 3.4 
1957-58 99.7 1.9 100.3 6.4 
1958-59 108. 1 9.4 106. 3 · 6.0 
1959-60 109.8 1.7 101. 9 -4.4 
1960-61 112. 7 3.9 105.·9 4.0 
196l-62 116.8 4. 1 ,, lll ~8 5.9 
l 962-63 123. 3 · 9.5 118.8 7.0· 
13-year average 
bas·e . period for. 
index . 100,.0 lQO.O 
Source: Martin.A. Abrahamsen, 11 Cooperative Trends Show Progress, 11 News For Farmer 
Cooeeratives, Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Marc"fl;-19()5), p. 15. I.O C) 
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Supplies and Total Expenditures for Farm Supplies, 
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Y4t = 87,54 + 1,78 Tt (, 39)· 
{6,2) 
2 R = 0,63 
The numbers contained in parentheses ben~ath the estimated 
coefficients for Tare the standard errors of .the coefficients .. In. 
equation (6.1), R2 is .95, and the estimated coefficient has a signifi-
cant·student t-value at .05 lev~l whtch indicates that it is different 
from zero. In _equation .(6,2), R2 is ,63 and the estimated coefficient 
is different from zero at ·,05 level. 
The .results imply that the index numbers of cooperatively purchased 
farm supplies increased by 3,32 ·points each year. On the other hand, 
the index, numbers of total expenditures for a 11 farmers for certain 
supplies increase by l .78 points each year. 
The two trend coefficient.s s31 and a41 , were tested. to determine. 
whether or not they were from the same population. · With a calculated t-
va 1 ue of 3~300 and a tabulated t-value of ·2.074 for the 95 percent level, 
the. results indicate that the two coefficients are not from the same 
population.· The ~onclusion is that the index numbers .of cooperatively 
purchased .farm supplies .increased at a faster average rate than the 
index. number of the total expenditures for all farm supplies by all 
farmers in the period 1950-1963, 
First differences of·the data for the period 1950-51 through 
1962-63 were used in a statistical equation to.estimate the inter-
relationships existing between. c;hanges in total farm inputs purchased 
and changes in purchasing through cooperatives. The equation was 
similar to equation (5,3) which was used for farm marketings. 
The estimated equation is .as follows: 
" 
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y3t·= 2.898 + .793 y4t (6.3) 
where 
( 0148) 
v3t·"" first difference-in successive years (y3t - y3t_1) .of 
the index numbers of the net value of-farm.supplies 
purchased through cooperatives: 
v4t = first difference in s~ccessive years (Y4t - y4t_1) of 
the index numbers of -.the tota 1 cash expenditures .by 
all farmers .for farm supplies. 
The number. contained in parentheses beneath the estimated 
coefficient for Y 4 is the standard error· of the_ coefficient. R2 is 
.75 and the coefficient for the independent variabl.e has a significant 
t~value at the .05 level, whi~h indicates that it is different from ~ero. 
The results .indicate .that a one.unit-increase.in the index (as a 
first difference) of total cash expenditures by all farmers for.farm. 
supplies is acGompanied by a .79 unit in.crease (as first difference) in 
cooperatively purchased farm supplies. However, .this coefficient is 
not-significantly different from a 1:1 relattonship which indicates that. 
changes ·.in cooperative purchases are associated very closely with changes 
in total expenditures. 
Distribution of-Net Savings 
Net savin~s .of.cooperative firms commonly are distributed among 
farmer:-members as patronage payments. These savings of purchasing 
cooperatives vary by years, by areas, and by types. of supplies and 
equipment .. 
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Most ,.retail cooperatives in the early.years realized substantial 
savings. They began by pooling their funds for the joint purchase of 
fertilizer from whatever source it cou 1 d be bought on the best terms. 
On this single farm input; there has been a· 10 percent decline in the. 
pri c~. 13 · This was considered a net savings --for the members, · 
Purchasing cooperatives·saved an average of-ten to t~elve cents on 
each dollar 1_s worth of petroleum products handled in 1920-40 period. 14 
In recent years, net savings on retqil and wholesale operations of 
.regional purchasing cooperatives have not -been ~s great as in earlier 
years _and have.been exceeded by savings from manufacturing and pro-
cessing operati-ons. Reports-from 105 regional purchasing cooperatives 
showed that their.total net savings were about $88 millio~ in 1962~ 
These net savings .were allocated to their member-patrons~ The distribu-
tion of net savings, .classified on the basis of membership of the 
cooperatives~ is shown in Table XI. 
In 1962, the 105 Tegional ,purchasing cooperatives as a group paid 
federal and state income taxes amounting to nine percent of their total 
net savings. They paid 12 percent of their net savings after taxes as . 
13voorhis, p. 18. 
14u~s .. Department of Agriculture, Farmer Coo eratives in the United 
States, Farmer Co.operative Service, ·Bulletin 1 Was ,ngton,19'5'5J', 
p. 166. . . 
TABLE XI 
DISTRIBUTION OF NET SAVINGS OF 105 REGIONAL PURCHASING 
COOPERATIVES~ FISCAL YEAR 1962 . 
Percentage -of Net·savings~Distributed As"'..;..·· 
Total Net ·· - · ·· · · · · · · 
Classification Number Savings Patronage Refunds 
Of- Of Before Dividends And On Current Year's Unallocated 
Cooperatives . Cooperatives Taxes Interest On-"'. . . Business Reserves Income Taxes 
Other. 
Common Preferred Equity Paid In 
__ ____ Stock. Stock Cap_ital _Cash Allocated Federal State 
Source: Nelda Griffin, Financial Structure of Regional Farmer Coo erati_ves, Farmer Cooperative 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, .General Report 133 tWashington, 1966 , p. 40. 
'° (.J1 
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dividends and interest on their equity capital. They retained about 4 
percent on unallocated reserves. They refunded 83.8 percent of their 
net savings after taxes to their patrons on the basis of current year 1 s 
business and unallocated reserves. They paid 37 percent of the refunds 
in cash •. 
In summary, the. purchasing cooperative firms make savings from 
purchasing~ manufacturing, processing and marketing farm inputs. These 
savings, or net revenues that the members get, mean that part of the 
profits that otherwise would have been made at the expense of .farmers 
have been returned to them through their own cooperative firms~ These 
net savings are considered as additional income to the farmer-members. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The basic problem underlying th.is study is the apparent lack of 
market power of farmers in the market place, Farmers have faced monop-
sony power in marketing their products and monopoly power,in purchasing 
farm inputs, 
In this study, the economics of the cooperative firm have been 
investigat:ed, The economics .of horizontal and vertical· integration by 
cooperatives have been reviewed, The major purpose was to evaluate the 
growth and potential benefits to farmers of cooperative firms in the 
marketing of farm products and in the purchasing of farm inputs. 
Specifically, the objectives were: 1) to determine the potential 
advantages.of cooperative firms for farmer-meribers; 2) to investigate 
th.e effects of hori zonta 1 and vertica 1 integration by cooperatives; and 
3) to rev few the hi stori.ca 1 · growth and determine the. growth ra_tes of 
cooperative marketing of farm products .and purchasing of farm supplies 
in the United States, 
The cooperative has been defined as a firm, The three fundamental 
principles which distinguish the cooperative from noncooperative firm -~ 
are democrat.ic control, limited return .on capital, anc! service at cost. 
The cooperative firm through its. marketing act.ivHies .may 
differentiate homogeneous farm products and change the farmers• 
perfectly competitive market to an imperfectly competitive market 
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structure, The cooperative firm has some degree of monopolistic control 
over its output and product prices in the market if the cooperative faces. 
a downward sloping demand curve for its product, If average cost is 
le~s ,than price, eco~omic profits exist, The cooperative 1 s economic 
profit could be distributed as patronage payments, Thus, the entry of 
an efficient cooperative firm _into the market may force the noncoopera-
ti.ve fi.rm to i ncrea·se the prices paid to the farmers for farm products~ 
This entry would-tend to increase the returns.to farmers as owners of 
the farm products by noncooperative firms,· 
Market advantage as a motivation for integration through 
.cooperatives may operate in two directions, Firstt it may be through 
forward integration to market fa.rm products. · Second, it may be through 
backward integration to purchase and process farm inpµts" The possible 
enhancement of economic gains becomes a further incentive, 
Horizontal integrati6n is one basis for gaining market advantage, 
This mottye for horizontal integration ar,ises under conditions.of an 
imperfect market structure, In some instances it is related to control 
of one or more stages in th.e sequence of marketing farm products and. 
purchasing farm inputs. The cooperatives, through horizontal integra-
tion, may achieve lower per unit costs as the size of the firm's plant 
is increased~ .. Empirical studies indicated that the horizontal integra-
tion of.fruit packing cooperatives could reduce average packing expense 
from~$,95 to $,85 -per box. This would be the economic gain from 
horizontal integration .and economies of size, 
The motives for-vertical integration are: 1) to maximize the 
cooperative's net revenue which will be refunded to its members; and 
2) to gain market power to influence the price for its own benefit, 
Therefore, the cooperative fi.rms ·-may become more profitable and gain 
market power through _verti.cal integrati-on .. 
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Forward vertical integration by cooperatives ,may involv.e 
differentiation of farm products through processing,_ grading, canning, 
and branding. ~mpirical studies indicated that vertica.lly-integrated 
cooperative marketing and processing of cott~nseed have increased the 
net returns far members. Increased net retµrns to the farmer-members 
for cottons_eed were .$12.77 -per ton for Arkansas, $18.63 .for California, . 
$11 .60 for Mississippi, $16.75 for Oklahoma, and $13.99 for Texas .in 
1959-60 seas.on .. In marketi:ng farm· products, the· Southwestern Irrigated 
Cotton Growers Association is a vertically-integrated cooperative fi'rm. · 
It gins cotton and processes cottonseed for its membersi · In 1959, it 
paid $9.26 _per ton or,about 15 percent as net revenue over the market 
price. 
The cooperati~e may integrate backward through production or 
purchasing of farm inputs,such as feed, fertilizer and petroleum for 
sale to farmers. · Man_y cooperative purchasing firms have integrated.· 
· backward in order to co_unter the monopolistic practice_s which farmers 
believe suppliers are exer~tsing .. In purchasing cooperatives~ great 
emphasis has been placed an gaining economiesof size, impraving the 
quality of farm inputs, and increasing net returns to cooperative . 
members ... For example, Farmland Industries, Inc_orporated, is a 
vertically-integrated fertilizer manufacturer. It sells fertilizer at 
wholesale to its local cooperative .members. In -1965, the price of 
fertilizer was $70. 84 per ton and farmers .were. refunded $8. 52 net 
revenue as patronage payments. 
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More than 8 9 000 cooperative firms were engaged in marketing farm 
products and purchasing farm inputs in the United Statesf in 1966. · Total 
membership in. these cooperatives was more than 7 million, but this 
ihcl.udes some duplication because some are members of more than one 
cooperative. 
The ~rowth·of the cooperative marketing sector has been ·substantial., 
based on an analysis of index numbefs of the net value of cooperatively 
marketed. farm products and of the total cash receipts by all farmers, 
during the period 1950 through 1963~ The index of.cooperatively 
marketed farm products increased an average of 3. 9 points each yea'r, 
The increase·in the index of total marketing was lower, 1.3 ,points 
annually. The estimated coefficients are stattstically different.from 
each other~ Therefore, the value ,of cooperative.ly marketed farm 
products increased at a greater rate than, the. value of total marketings 
of farm products in th.e period 1950 · through 1963. 
Firs~ differen~es of data were also used to investigat.e the 
interrelationships betwee.n changes in total marketings and changes in 
cooperattve marketings. The re~;ults indicate ·that only part of the 
growth,1n marketing through cooperatives can be attributed to changes 
in aggregate sales of all farm products. · 
The growth of cooperatively purchased farm supplies also has been 
substantial~ Comparison of the index·numbers of the net value .of. 
cooperatively, purchased farm supplies and the .total cash. expenditures 
of all farr,ers for.farm.supplies.shows that, from 1950 through 1963, 
h 
th~ cooper~tively pur~hased farm supplies increased at a greater rate 
than the total expenditures. The index of cooperatively purchased farm 
I 
supplies in~reased an average of 3.3 points each year as compared with 
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an increase of 1.7 points per year for: total expenditures for farm 
supplies. The estimated coefficients are statisti~ally different from 
each other .. 
Based on first difference analysis, the relati.onships .between 
changes in total expe11ditures for farm supplies .and changes in coopera-. 
tively purchased farm supplies was quite close. The coefficient 
indica.ted that the first .difference of the index number of· the net value 
of cooperatively purchased farm supplies ·increased O. 79 points for each 
one.point increase in the first difference of the index of the total 
expenditures of al 1 farmers.· The coefficient was not significantly 
different -from-unity . 
. Far:m coeperatives in 1964 marketed _about 25 percent of all fa.rm 
products and handled, 20 percent of all farm inputs purchased in the 
United States. Even though the cooperatives 0 share of the market may 
be .small, the unique feature of provi.ding service at cost may return 
a .part,of the profit of the marketing and purchasing sectors to the 
cooperatives 0 member.sand result in higher product prices.and lower· 
input prices •.. 
The results of this study indicate. that farmers have formed 
markettng and purchasing cooperatives to obtain increased 11et-returns •. 
Apparently they have·been succes~ful since cooperative marketing and 
purchasing have expanded and there is evidence of higher net returns 
to member-patrons. In a dynamic economy; further.changes may be-needed. 
Indications are that with further horizontal and vertical integration by 
cooperatives, the farmer-members.may get higher -net revenues from above--
market prices in marketing farm.products and below-average costs in 
purchasing farm inputs. 
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It is hoped that the cooperative firm models reviewed in this study 
will help 1n understanding the economics of horizontal and vertical 
integration by cooperative firms,. However, the models need empirical 
testing which ~an be provided only through further research, Measure-
ment of the effects of horizontal and vertical integration and the 
determination of the optimum degree of .horizontal integration and the 
optimum economic stage of vertical integration .are needed. 
The effects of cooperative firms on production supply and prices 
appear substantial, However, quantttati~e estimates of these effects 
are not available~ An analysis .is nee.ded which would trace the economic 
effects of the cooperative firmsa existence and actions on the supply, 
prices, and the net incomes for both members and nonmembers of · 
cooperative firms, 
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APPENDIX A 
VIEWS THAT A COOPERATIVE IS NOT A FIRM 
The notion that a cooperative is not a.firm has been pointed out 
by many writer.s. Ivan Emel ianoff regarded a cooperative as an aggregate 
of economic·µnits. coordinating their activities,. but.each fully retaining 
its- economic individuality and independence.. The aggregate ·is. "an 
agency of the associated units, own.ed and controlled by them through 
which they conduct. thei_r business activities".. 1 Further, "an aggregate 
is functioning only as a branch or part of assofiated e~onomic units~ 
Therefore, a cooperative as an aggregate is perfectly identical. with 
the special departments and branches of single economic units 11 • 2 He also 
said that "since a cooperative_ is inherently furthering or completing 
the economic activities of members, all the members of cooperative. 
associatfon necessarily participate. in the eco.riomic work ·of the 
' t' II assoc,a ,on. 
Emelianoff 1 s major conclusion is that a cooperative association is 
not a firm but rather is an aggr~gate or association of,economic,units 
(firms or· households). He presented an analytical explanation in which 
he has -reconciled that concept of a cooperati.ve association with the. 
1rvan,V. Emelianoff,. Economic Theory of Cooperation .(Ann Arbor, 
Mi~h.igan, 1948), p. 248. · 
2Emelianoff, p. 249. 
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distinc~ive techniques~ methods~ and practices that are characteristic. 
of cooperative association. 
Robotka pointed out four characteristics of cooperatives. 3 First~ 
horizontal combination of autonomous economic unitsi Second, .because 
the member units retain their autonomy, it ,follows that the combination 
must have a federal rat~er than an authoritarian form of organizationi 
· Third, every. true· cooperative represents an effort on the part oJ two 
or more autonomous units jointly to conduct, coordinating with each 
·';:.other, given-operations essential to the economic activity of member 
units,. It is the avowed purpose of true~cooperators not to interpose 
a business enterprise .(a firm) between the,mselves .and their .market, . In 
a technical economic sense~. this can.mean.only that it is their purpose. 
to function in their own.capacities as sovereign units, that is, to 
perform.designated funct.ions or services as integrated with their. 
individual economic pursuits. Fourth, the cooperative ~rganization. 
consists ~f the sum of the relationships and arrangements established 
among member units .in order to effec;tuate their purpose. In an economic 
sense, th~se.arrang~ments are desjgned to enable member units Jointly to 
participate in the performance of their entrepreneurial functions.with. 
respect to the _given.activities which they desire to conduct in 
coordination with each other. In a legal sense, the c;:ooperative .organi-
zation consists of a bundle of multilateral agreements among the members 
designed to give legal effect to their economic·purpose, - The coopera-
tive association is thus the economic and legal instrumentality through 
3Fra,nk Robotka, 11A Theory. of ~ooperation ,II Journal of Farm 
Economics,_ VoL XXIX (February, 1947), pp •. 94-114.- ---
which or by means of which member units carry out their purpose to 
conduct a jointly integrated activity. 
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Phillips advanced the same view. He drew a distinction between.the 
cooperative association on the one hand and the ~ooperative plant on th, 
other. The cooperative plant-has no ecptiomic life of its _own, and 
rather should be co·nceived as a part of each participating firm. 4 · 
Phillips• model involves:. (l) the economic st_ru~t~re of ·the 
cooperative _associati,on;. (2)- the e<";o-nomic relat.ionshi-ps among. the 
participat_ing units.; and (3) the condition necessary for profi,t · 
maxi_mization in .the coo_perating firms.,. 
With respect-to the ~conomic,structure of the cooperative 
association,. Phillips says that when a group of individual firms .forms 
a cooperative association; they_ agree mutually to, set up a pl ant and 
operate it j~intl.y as-an integral part of _each .of.their individual 
firms. The cooperative has no more economic life or purpose, apart 
from that of the participating economic units, than one,of the individual 
plants of a,lay,ge multiplant firm .•. Instead, the participating firms 
agree to function coordinately with respect to their join,t activity. 
He concludes that, when two or more economic units conduct any of their 
individual busi.ness activities cooperatively, the result is not a ,new 
fi.rm b4t a common economic plant~ And it-is technically correct to 
speak of the cooperative plant .and of cooperating firms. but not of the .. 
cooperattve firm .. 
With respect- to the eco:nomic,relationships among the.member firms~ 
Phillip~ says that each member firm's share of the joint_ plant is 
4Richard Phi 11 ips, "Economic ·.Natur.e of· the C~operative Association, 11 
Journal of Farm Economic$ Vol. XXXV. (February, 19.53), p. 74-87. 
--- . ' . 
defined by, the relative stze of the production act,ivities .in the 
individual plant of each'firm with whi-ch the activities conducted 
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through the joint plan~ are.integrated. This proportionality determines. 
how participating firms will share -the use·of the joint plant, voting, 
control, costs .and risks, unc~,rtainties, financfal responsibilities, 
and ,the economic benefits, Thi-s -proportionality also applies over ,time 
and among the different departments of the joint plant if -more than one 
activity is conducted through the joint plant. 
With respect to the, conditfons necessary for profit maximization 
- of the firms participatin~ in a joint plant, these are ·the same as those. 
of any firm. · A cooperating firm determines ,its optimum output by 
equating the sum of the marginal. cost functions in all plants (including 
the joint plant) with the _marginal revenue 'in the final pla.nt ·from which 
' ' 
the product is marketed .. 
Phillips 1 treatment is J:>ased on the orthodox theory of the firm as 
a .profit-maximizing enterpri.se. However, the fi-rm which .he speaks .of 
is the household; and he- denies that a cooperative associati,on composed 
of firms or households can have economic life or purpose apart from 
partktpating econ~mic units. 
In conclusion; all -the above writers agree·that the ~ooperative 
organization is not viewed as a .firm because the caop~rative does hot-_ 
operate for prqfits for-itself and is therefore not capable of-
entr~preneurial decisions. - Thus, according to their views a c~operative 
is _not a.firm. 
APPENDIX B 
SINGLE PLANT AND MULTIPLANT FIRM MODELS 
Single Product-Single Plant 
Basec! on th.e marginal an~lysts, th.e cooperative_ firm allocates the 
productiiV'e inputs, minimizes· co-sts, and maximizes. profits .for its 
member"'.patrons .. The production function assumes techni·ca.l efficiency: 
and 'the maximu°" output,.Y, fro1TI the, combinat.ion .of-variable inputs .0<1, 
x2, x3, .•• -, , Xn) .. Equation (B.l) represents a single product sh.ort-
run ,production function in which n inputs are variable and (Xn + l, . 
• .• , \/ inputs: are-fixed .. 
( B. l ) 
It is assumed that all \ .(i = 1, 2,· ... , n). are purch.ased at 
P; and Y .is sold a:~ PY per unit and. cost funGtion expressed the_ mini.mum. 
· cost of pr~ducing a $pecific level_ of output Y given the technical 
conditions. of producti-on function and :the input prices. · The total cost·· 
is 
n 
TC·= A + E P; X. , . ., 
i -=., 
(B~2) 
A represents the cost of the _fixed. inpu,ts •. The total .variable cost is . 
defined, by equation (B.3). 
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n 
TVC = E 
; =l 
' 
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(B.3) 
The cooperative firm 1 s total revenue and total cost·can bot~ be expressed 
as .functions of output in (B.4). 
TR= R(V) and TC= C(Y) (B.4) 
The cooperative firm 1 s profit (w) is the difference between its total 
revenue and its total cost, and is defined by equation (8;5). 
1r = R(Y) - C(Y) (B.5) 
To maximize profit($) set the first derivative of (B.5) with respect to 
Y equat to zero as in (B.6). 
d1r aR(Y) aC(Y) = O 
dV = av av (B.6). 
or 
aR(V) = aC(Y) 
av av 
or 
Therefore, marginal revenue must equal marginal cost for the profit 
maximization condition. To insure.a profit maximum rather than a 
minimum, the second derivative must be less than zero.1 
a2c(Y) 
-____,,. .... < 0 
av2 
(B. 7) 
1James M. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: 
A Mathematical Approach (New York, 1958}, p. 169. · · · · 
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Single Product -,Multiplant 
The cooperative firm may use more than one, plant to produce its 
product. The mar'.g.inal analysis is applicable to th.is situation. Assume 
tMat a cooperative firm produces its output in two, separate plants with 
some geographic separation among plants. Assume further that the output 
Y is sold in a ,single market.. Then, the output of the product -which 
maximizes the firm's profit, ,will .be produced in all pl,ants until 
marginal costs (MC 1) in each plant (i- ~ 1, 2) are equivalent and all 
MC's eventually _will be equated to th_e marginal revenue (MR}. The 
firm's profit (TI} is the difference between total revenue (TR) and 
total costs (TC1) for both plants: 
(B.8) 
where v1 and v2 are the quantities which the firm produces in the two 
plants~ R(Y1 + v2) is the revenue function and_ c1(v1) and c2(Y2) are the 
cost functions .... Setting the partial derivatives .of (B.8) with respect 
to v1 and v2 equal to ze}:'o, and with the, assumption that YT and v2 ~re 
different quantities of the.same. product Y. 
a 7T aR(Y1 + V2) aCT{Yrf 0 av1 - av 1 = av 1 (B.9} 
a1r . - aR(Y1 + V2) ac2(V2) 0 av2 - av2 ·. = av2 (B.10) 
ac1(v1) 
= MC av1 vl (B.ll) 
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(B.12) 
Assuming that.Mey is equal to MCy , therefore, 
1 2 
aR(v1 + v2) _ aR(Y1 + v2) 
a y 1 . = a y 2 = MRY (B. 13) 
Thus, 
MRy = MCy = MC 
1 Y2 
(B. 14) 
The MC in each plant must equal the MR of the output as a whole. 2 
The second order condition requires the principle minors of the 
relevant Hessian determinant alternate in signs beginning with a 
negative sign. 
Therefore, 
. (B. 16) implies _that 
2 a c1(v1) 
--.....- < 0 
av 2 l 
2Henderson and Quandt, p. 173. 
.(B. 15) 
(B.16) 
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and 
(B.1:8) 
Then (B.16) and(B. 17) imply th,at 
(B.19) 
This means that marginal costs (MC.) in each plant must be increasing 
1 
more rapidly.than the marginal revenue (MRY) of the output as a whole. 
APPENDIX. C 
THE MULTIPRODUCT COOPERATIVE FIRMl 
The .Profit-maximizing conditions for the cooperative firm·. 
producing more than one product are developed, When a firm produces 
more than one product, there. usually exists i nterrel ationshi ps among. 
inputs and outputs which must be taken into, account to determine the 
profit~maximizing conditions of the firm. 
The case when n variables ,inputs are used to produce two products 
will be discussed. Let v1 and v2 be two products produced by a firm 
with variable resources x1, 9 •• , \i· .. The output of. v1 and Y2 is 
now a function~f the variable inputs x1, . ~ • , ln' and the amount 
2 
of the other product produced. 
( c. l ) 
(C.2) 
It is assumed that marginal products of v1 and v2 with. respect ~o each 
of the varial:ile inputs is positive .. The rate of technical substitution 
between v1 and v2 is given by the partial derivative of (C. l) with. 
respect to v2 or the partial derivative of (C.2) with respect to v1. · 
1Thi~ mod~l is applicable to ~he conglomerate integrated 
cooperative firm. 
. 
2sune Carlson, \A Study . .Q!l the Pure Theory of Production (New 
York, 1956), p. 84. · 
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(C.3) 
In a case where. one variable input is us.ed to produce two products, 
the amount of the variable input employed is a function of the level of· 
output of the two product~. The technical relationship in this case is 
. 2 
defined by the nature of the mixed deriyative ava;!v . v1 and v2 are 
1 2 
defined to be technically complementary, technically substitutable or 
. . 2 
technically independent~ according to whether aYa :v is negative, 
3 l 2 
positive -0r zero. Where. more than one variable input is used to 
produce two products, .the quantity of each- variable input used depends 
not only on the quantity of the products produced, but also on the 
employment level of .the other inputs. In such a case, the technical 
relationships .between v1 and Y2 cannot-be defined in terms of the mixed 
partial derivatives as in the case where a single input is used. The 
relationship between costs and output is used to define the technical 
relati-0nship between the products v1 and v2 where more than one variable 
resource is used. 
Resources are employed such that the ratio of the price of the 
resource to the marginal product of.the resource is the same for each 
resource in the production of a product. The equality of ratios is 
not necessarily .equal_ among products .. These ratios give the marginal 
cost of producing the respective products. 
In joint production, the marginal cost of one product, say v1~ 
may vary with a change in the level of other product, v2. This may be 
3 Carlson, .p. 79. 
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bec&use the reJources_chang~ with the level of -inputs or because the· 
products are tech_nica.lly .inter~ependel')t. If resource. pri~es are· 
assumed to be independent of the lev~l of .employment, the technical 
re.lat ionsh,i p between 2 the. products Y 1 and Y 2 can be dete.rmi ned from th.e 
mixed derivative av° ;Y , where. C(Y1, Y2) is the ·firm's -total cost 1 .. 2 . 
function.· The products are defined to be tee hn ica 11 y comp 1 ementary, . 
substitutable, or independent 
positive, or equal to ,zero. 
2 
according to whethe.r av~ ~y2 is nega,tive, 
In the multiproduct cooperative .firm,, the _demand ·for the .prodl;!:cts 
may also be int~rrelated'. · In such case~ the _product prices are 
functions, of all pro.ducts produced instead_ of only one product. For 
the two product cas_e; the following relations exist: 
P = P(Y1, Y2) Y1 
P =.P(Y1, Y2) Y2 . 
(C.4). 
aP aP 
It is as.sumed that ·_:i and _!1. are always negative.; The direc.tion of-
. av1 av· .. · · 
effect of a change in the quanti ~y of· one product on the price .of the 
aP aP 
other product,is not always the same. That is,. Y1 and. Y2 may be· 
aY2 aVj" 
positive, negative, -0r ,equal to zero.: In the. two produ~t case, total 
revenue is a funGtion of v1 and -Y2, 
(C5) 
The profit, 1r,- also is a function of v1 and Y2" Expressing profit as. 
(C.6) 
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The first•order conditions require that 
(C,7a,) 
and 
~ = v aPy1 av1 aPy2 ac 
V l av2 ... + Pyl aY + Py2 + V2 .. ar- - av--= 0 a 2 · 2 2 2 
Second~order cond1tipns.require that 
2 2 
LL. and~< 0 
av 2 av 2 1 2 .. 
and 
Equations (C.7a) and (C,7b) express important relation5:hips ,lfn the .... 
determination of the firm 1 s price and sales policy. From (C.7a) the 
price ~f v1 that maximizes profit is 
(C.8) 
(C.9) 
aPy2 .. av 
If -ar is positive and a/ also positive, the!] Py1 - :~ < 0, Then l l .. l 
it is possibl~ that v1 should be sold at a price less than.its marginal 
121 ·. 
4 aPy2 av 
cost. Then v1 and v2 are complements. If~ is negative and aY~ 
~s -also negative, then Py1 - !~1 > 0. Then v1 should be sold at a 
price mar~ than. its marginal cost. Then v1 and v2,are subs~itute · 
products. The above relationships indicate that .a firm desi.res to 
have technical and market compl ementari.ty among produc:ts and groups of-
products, while. technicq._l and market substitutability is desired among 
inputs and groups of inputs; 
4 R.G~D. Allen, Mathematical. Analysis F~r Economists (London, 
1962), P~ 362~ 
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